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Presented by

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What is the article about?

- An attack on the electrical system in Italy
- Structure of the control system
- Attack scenarios
 - Malware
 - DoS
- Impact of a potensional attack
 - Costs, economy

Introduction

- Generation, Transmission, Distribution
- What level of security investment should be considered adequate?
- Who bears the costs?
- The damage, distribution between suppliers and customers


Structure of the Industrial Control System

- Client/server network
 - connects HMI client stations of the SCADA and auxilliary servers
- Control network
 - connects the controllers, OPC servers and engineering workstations

Implements two protocols:

- IEEE 802.1w Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol
- IEC 62439 Medium Redundancy Protocol

Structure of the Industrial Control System



Attack Scenarios

Stuxnet discovered 2010

Malware that exploits vulnerabilities

- not only SCADA
- other systems aswell

DoS attack

- big delays
- frozen data and useless info

The effects of the scenarios had

- both dramatic consequences for network performance
- different dynamics
- different durations for recovering
- situation leading to shutdown

Differences for the attacks

- Malware took longer to cure than a DoS attack
 - could come from several nodes
- DoS affected only a few devices
 - easier to isolate from the network
- Both attacks was considered time consuming
- Main consequence is a sudden loss of hundreds of MW

Events added for for a realistic scenario


- informatics attack on highest generation power plant
- outages of other plants due to frequency
- maintainance on the connection to the NTG
- isolated but supplyed because of the local subgrid
- Causes a total blackout of the area


- 1-3 hours for renewable sources
- 6 hours for a full recovery

- power plant A—thermoelectric with 1,280 MW of gross power,
- power plant B—thermoelectric with 774 MW of gross power,
- power plant C—thermoelectric with 1,340 MW of gross power,
- power plant D—hydroelectric with 500 MW of gross power,
- power plant E—gas turbine with 180 MW of gross power,
- power plant F—thermoelectric with 470 MW of gross power, and
- photovoltaic and wind-distributed generators with 2,500 MW of total gross power.

Impacts of Attack

Hourly profile in absence of an attack, and in case of an attack





Evaluation of the Economic Impact

- Productive sector
- Electricity industry

Productive sector

- Refers to related work
- Value Added (VA)
- Electricity Consumption (EC)
- Value of Lost Load (VoLL)
- Gives a good guess of potentionally loss
- About 35 million euros

$$Voll_i = \frac{VA_i}{EC_i}$$

Electricity industry

- Value of unsupplied energy
- VA lost for generators
- 2 million euros

average market price: €107.486/MWh; undelivered energy: 11,542 MWh; lost revenues for generators: €107.486 × 11,542 = €1,240,602.

 $1,240,602 - (11,542 \times 52.83) = 630,838.$

This value, adjusted for inflation for the first quarter of 2014, is

VA lost for generators = €636,169.

Conclusion

- Outage of one part leads to a widespread shutdown
- Security investment should therefore be considered
- Productive sector suffered much more than the electricity industry

Evaluation of the article and key findings

- Refers often to other work
 - Shows that they have a lot of work to refer to
 - Knowledge could also be outdated

Many long sentences with much information ex. ->

This work provides quantitative empirical support and reports results from the Essence project (Emerging Security Standards to the EU Power Network Controls and Other Critical Equipment; http://essence.ceris.cnr.it), founded by the European Commission through the Prevention. Prenaredness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and Other Security-Related Risks (CIPS) program, with focus on the monetary impact that a potential cyberattack could have on the electric industry and other productive sectors. Previous ver-

Details

- Goes very deep in details some places
- Not so deep other places, ex. Stuxnet example

Attack scenarios

- Missing details
- How did they measure the different durations on recovery time?

Impact of the attack

Ignores other costs and other consequences

- Almost 60% "other costs"
- What are the other costs?
- Ignores other costs
 - Mentioned in the text

Sector	Non supplied energy (MWh)	Value of the lost load (VoLL) (per kWh)	Loss of value added (VA) (× 1,000)	Energy dependence (share)	Corrected Voll (per kWh)	Corrected loss of VA (× 1,000)
Agricultural	382.77	€6.73	€2,575.09	0.40	€2.69	€1,030.04
Industrial						
Food products, beverages, and tobacco	389.86	€3.02	€1,17740	0.90	€2.72	€1,059.66
Fextiles, textile products, and eather products	14.38	€10.25	€14747	0.90	€9.23	€132.72
Coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel (chemical and pharmaceutical)	3,248.13	€0.35	€1,124.18	0.90	€0.31	€1,011.76
Mechanical Equipment, Electric and optical Equipment, and transport Equipment	544.34	€2.89	€1,573.69	0.90	€2.60	€1,416.32
Gas	21.64	€17.90	€387.43	0.90	€16.11	€348.69
Water	718.89	€1.61	€1,157,41	0.90	€1.45	€1,041.67
Construction	68.35	€59.99	€4,100.49	0.40	€24.00	€1,640.20
Other	910.71	€1.96	€1,788.61	0.90	€1.77	€1,609.75
Services						
Commercial	787.90	€5.35	€4,213.76	0.80	€4.28	€3,371.00
Hotels and restaurants	377.22	€3.33	€1,256.27	0.80	€2.66	€1,005.01
inancial ntermediation	53.74	€26.03	€1,398.84	0.80	€20.82	€1,119.07
Other	1,667.00	€14.89	€24,827.31	0.80	€11.91	€19,861.84
Total damage			€45,727.95			€34,647.74

- Compared this study to other similiar studies
 - About the same result in percentage

- Other consequences
 - Psychological damage
 - Health and lives more important

Views of the authors only