UiO : Department of Technology Systems
University of Oslo

TEK5530 - Measurable Security for the Internet of Things

# L6 – Multi-Metrics Analysis for Measurable Security

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# Overview

- Learning outcomes
- Use case (application) SocialMobility
- Values for Security, Privacy
- Analyse the system of systems
- Identify Security, Privacy attributes and functionality for a sub-system
- Multi-Metrics analysis
- Future work

# Expected Learning outcomes

Having followed the lecture, you can

- establish a scenario/use case
- provide application examples
- provide reasons for the choice of s,p,d
- establish a system architecture with sub-systems and components
- explain the Multi-Metrics method
- (prepare for your own work)

# Traditional: Threat-based approach




[source: http://securityontology.sba-research.org/]

# Roadmap for a more secure and privacy-aware society

- "Vulnerability analysis" is not sufficient
  - ➡ novel threats occur
  - ➡ installation base for 5-20 years
  - ➡ example: increase in DDoS attack capability







- Business advantage for European industries
  - Security classes/levels

. https://securityintelligence.com/the-weaponization-of-iot-rise-of-the-thingbots/

# Multi-Metrics Methodology for Assessment of Security, Privacy, and Dependability (SPD)


Thanks to our colleagues from SHIELD for the collaboration

» Iñaki Equia, Frode van der Laak, Seraj Fayyad, Cecilia Coveri, Konstantinos Fysarakis, George Hatzivasilis, Balázs Berkes, Josef Noll

Feb2015

ARTEMIS

# Accountable security

- Assessment
  - ➡ Comparison desired Class vs Calculated class
- Modelling
  - ➡ SPD Metrics, from criticality to SPD value
- Framework
  - ➡ Examples of applicability
- Measurable Security
  - ➡ Security is not 0/1







**to measurable: security, privacy and dependability**

| SPD level | SPD vs $SPD_{Goal}$ |
|---|---|
| (67,61,47) | (●,●,●) |
| (67,61,47) | (●,●,●) |
| (31,33,63) | (●,●,●) |

# Methodology: From System description to SPD level




- System: Automatic Meter System (AMS) consists of reader (AMR), aggregator, communications, storage, user access
- Sub-systems: AMR consists of power monitor, processing unit, communication unit
- Component: AMR communication contains of a baseband processing, antenna, wireless link
- Configuration Parameter: Wireless link: f=868 MHz, output power=?, Encryption=?

# Measurable Security, Privacy, Dependability (SPD)

- Focus on «entry the industrial market»
- Industry «needs security» - with entry models
- System Security, Privacy and Dependability is assessed
  - Application $SPD_{Goal}$
  - $SPD_{System}$ asessment
  - Comparison $SPD_{Level}$



# Measurable Security

- From people defined security classes
- To automated security decisions
  - ➡ through metrics assessment




- based on
  - ➡ security, privacy and dependability (SPD) functionalities



# Multi-Metrics - system composition

- System consists of sub-systems consists of components
  - security
  - privacy
  - dependability



# Multi-Metrics components

- Components have a security, privacy and dependability factor.
- Metrics assess the components






# Example:
# Privacy in a Social Mobility Use Case

- Social Mobility, including social networks, here: loan of vehicle
- Shall I monitor the user?



# Privacy: Loan of vehicle

- Scenario 1: privacy ensured, «user behaves»
- Scenario 2: track is visible as user drives too fast
- Scenario 3: Crash, emergency actions




- Industrial applicability: Truck operation (Volvo), Autonomous operations on building places, add sensors (eye control)

# Social Mobility Components

Applicable nSHIELD Components (Px):

- 1- Lightweight Cyphering (P1)
- 2- Key exchange (P2)
- 3- Anonymity & Location Privacy (P10)
- 4- Automatic Access Control (P11)
- 5- Recognizing DoS Attack (P13)
- 6- Intrusion Detection System (P15)
- 7- Attack surface metrics (P28)
- 8- Embedded SIM, sensor (P38)
- 9- Multimetrics (P27)



# Communication Subsystem Metrics

## (SPD) Metrics

- Port metric
- Communication channel
- GPRS message rate
- SMS rate
- Encryption



# Social Mobility - Examples of Metrics

GPRS message rate metric

| Parameter(sec) | 0.5 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 10 | 20 | 60 | 120 | $\infty$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cp | 80 | 60 | 45 | 30 | 20 | 15 | 10 | 5 | 0 |

Encryption metric

| Parameter | No encryption | Key 64 bits | Key 128 bits | Not applicable |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cp | 88 | 10 | 5 | 0 |

Metrics weighting

Port (M1), $w = 100$
Communication channel (M2), $w = 100$
GPRS message rate (M3), $w = 80$
SMS message rate (M4), $w = 20$
Encryption (M5), $w = 100$


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# Multi-Metrics subsystem evaluation

| | Criticality | | | | | $SPD_P$ | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | C1 | C2 | C3 | C4 | Sub-Sys. | | Scen. 1 | Scen. 2 | Scen. 3 |
| $SPD_{Goal}$ | | | | | | | (s,80,d) | (s,50,d) | (s,5,d) |
| Multi-Metrics Elements | M1 | M2 | M3 ∩ M4 | M5 | C1... ∩ ...C4 | | | | |
| Conf. A | 30 | 20 | 0 | 5 | 17 | 83 | 🟢 | 🔴 | 🔴 |
| Conf. B | 61 | 20 | 4 | 5 | 32 | 68 | 🟡 | 🟡 | 🔴 |
| Conf. C | 41 | 20 | 9 | 5 | 23 | 77 | 🟢 | 🟡 | 🔴 |
| Conf. D | 82 | 41 | 2 | 10 | 45 | 55 | 🟡 | 🟢 | 🔴 |
| Conf. E | 82 | 41 | 18 | 10 | 45 | 55 | 🟡 | 🟢 | 🔴 |
| Conf. F | 83 | 41 | 27 | 10 | 47 | 53 | 🟡 | 🟢 | 🔴 |
| Conf. G | 82 | 42 | 4 | 88 | 70 | 30 | 🔴 | 🟡 | 🔴 |
| Conf. H | 82 | 42 | 40 | 88 | 73 | 27 | 🔴 | 🟡 | 🔴 |
| Conf. I | 83 | 42 | 72 | 88 | Alarm | 21 | 🔴 | 🟡 | 🟡 |

# Privacy Scenarios - *to trigger your ideas*

- Loan of the car (normal operation, speeding, accident)
- The home medical equipment
  - Transmitting the data
  - Applications storing and handling the data
- Networked cameras and microphones
  - Privacy of persons captured
  - Who can access the data
  - What kind of operations can be performed on the data
- Speaking & listening doll
  - Microphone recording everything in the room (children playing, grown-ups discussing)
- FitBit & Smart Watches
  - sleeping cycle
  - puls, fitness
- *your take….*


*thanks to Elahe Fazelkohrdi*

# Privacy measuring in Smart Grids and Energy metering

- Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMI) and Smart Meters are deployed in Norway to automatically and continuously measure energy consumption.
- There are many Privacy Concerns around these:
  - How much Private information can be extracted from this data ?
  - How well is this data anonymized ?
  - How well can we measure the privacy implications of such Smart Systems ?
- Papers to start from (also see who cites these on scholar.google.com):
  - "Smart grid privacy via anonymization of smart metering data." by Costas Efthymiou and Georgios Kalogridis, in IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), 2010.
  - "Influence of data granularity on smart meter privacy." by Günther Eibl and Dominik Engel in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid 6.2 (2015): 930-939.
  - "Do not snoop my habits: preserving privacy in the smart grid." by Félix Gómez Mármol; Christoph Sorge; Osman Ugus; Gregorio Martínez Pérez in *IEEE Communications Magazine* 50.5 (2012).
  - "Achieving anonymity via clustering." by Aggarwal, et al. in *Proceedings of the twenty-fifth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems*. ACM, 2006.
  - "An overview of the use of clustering for data privacy." by Torra, Vicenç, Guillermo Navarro-Arribas, and Klara Stokes in *Unsupervised Learning Algorithms*. Springer, Cham, 2016. 237-251.

# Privacy measuring in Smart Buildings for Air Quality

- Multiple sensors are used to monitor air quality in Smart office buildings or industrial facilities. Various privacy sensitive data are being collected and analysed, ranging from office employees to secret industrial processes.
- There are many Privacy Concerns around these:
  - How much Information should be gathered for the task that is intended ?
  - Can the indoor location of people and processes be inferred; how precisely ?
  - If anonymized and minimised, can Machine Learning algorithms still perform well ?
- Papers to start from (also see who cites these on scholar.google.com):
  - "A terminology for talking about privacy by data minimization." by Pfitzmann, Andreas, and Marit Hansen. (2010).
  - "Monitoring Data Minimisation." by Pinisetty S, Antignac T, Sands D, Schneider G. (2018)
  - "A general survey of privacy-preserving data mining models and algorithms." by Charu C. Aggarwal and S. Yu Philip in book *Privacy-preserving data mining*. (2008)
  - "A survey of computational location privacy." by Krumm, John in *Personal and Ubiquitous Computing* 13.6 (2009): 391-399.
  - Book 2005: Privacy, security and trust within the context of pervasive computing
  - "Quantifying location privacy." by Shokri, Reza, et al. in *IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (2011)*
  - "Geo-indistinguishability: Differential privacy for location-based systems." by Andrés, Miguel E., et al. in *ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer & Communications Security*. (2013)

# Health Scenario, health record exchange



# Privacy-specific parameters

- Please discuss with your neighbours
  - a) other scenarios
  - b) what are the important privacy parameters

- Examples of privacy parameters
  - which data are collected
  - sharing to my phone, my cloud, public cloud,...
  - data communication integrity and storage
  - further distribution of data, ownership of data, further processing

# Privacy Labelling

http://PrivacyLabel.IoTSec.no





- "Measure, what you can measure - Make measurable, what you can't measure" - Galileo
- Privacy today
  - ➡ based on lawyer terminology
  - ➡ 250.000 words on app terms and conditions
- Privacy tomorrow
  - ➡ A++: sharing with no others
  - ➡ A: …
  - ➡ C: sharing with ….
- The Privacy label for apps and devices

**Appfail Report – Threats to Consumers in Mobile Apps**

The Norwegian Consumer Council analysed the terms of 20 mobile apps. The purpose is to uncover potential threats to consumer protection hidden in the end-user terms and privacy policies of apps.

# The economic perspective of Privacy Label

- The big 5 IT companies have a GDP as big as that of France
- Amazon largest sector in terms of revenue is selling of data
  - ➡ 20% of revenue

- How can SMEs compete?
  - ➡ Each service and device gets a privacy label

- Four areas for Privacy Label
  - ➡ which data are collected
  - ➡ sharing to my phone, my cloud, public cloud,...
  - ➡ data communication integrity and storage
  - ➡ further distribution of data, ownership of data, further processing

Privacy Label (A-F)
- easy visibility
- customer focus
- transparent


[privacylabel.IoTSec.no](privacylabel.IoTSec.no)

# Run-Through Example

- Car loan, privacy considerations

# Multi-Metrics$_{v2}$ - system composition

- here: communication sub-system vehicle <-> backend
  - Port metric
  - Communication channel
  - GPRS message rate
  - SMS rate
  - Encryption



# Social Mobility Configuration

- Conf. A: The ES does not send any SMS; GPRS data are encrypted with 128 bits key. The ES accepts remote configuration from the BE.
- Conf. B: same as above, except ES sends a keep alive message to the BE every 120 seconds.
- Conf. C: same as above, except BE sends messages to the ES and the last one replies every 60 seconds.
- Conf. D: The ES sends an SMS to parents; GPRS data to the BE are encrypted with 64 bits key. ES accepts remote configuration from the BE.
- Conf. E: same as above, except ES sends location and speed information to the BE every 10 seconds.
- Conf. F: same as above, except BE sends messages to the ES and the last one replies with location and speed information every 5 seconds.
- Conf. G: ES sends one SMS to parents, another to emergency services. Unencrypted data about the status of the MC are sent from the ES to the BE. ES accepts remote configuration from BE.
- Conf. H: same as above, except ES sends location and speed information to the BE every 2 seconds.
- Conf. I: same as above, except BE sends messages to the ES and the last one replies with location and speed information every 0.5 seconds.

# Metrics & weight (only privacy)

1) Port metric, weight $w_p$=40

| | Cp | SPDp |
|---|---|---|
| SNMP (UDP) 161 in the ES | 40 | 60 |
| SNMP trap (UDP) 162 in the BE | 60 | 40 |
| SSH (TCP) 23 in the ES | 30 | 70 |
| SMS | 80 | 20 |

2) Communication channel metric, weight $w_p$=20

| | *Cp* | *SPDp* |
|---|---|---|
| *GPRS with GEA/3* | *20* | *80* |
| *SMS over GSM with A5/1* | *40* | *60* |

3) GPRS message rate metric $w_p$=80

| *message delay* | *Cp* | *SPDp* |
|---|---|---|
| *0.5 sec* | *80* | *20* |
| *1 sec* | *60* | *40* |
| *2 sec* | *45* | *65* |
| *5 sec* | *30* | *70* |
| *10 sec* | *20* | *80* |
| *20 sec* | *15* | *85* |
| *60 sec* | *10* | *90* |
| *120 sec* | *5* | *95* |
| *No messages* | *0* | *100* |

4) SMS message rate metric $w_p$=20
0,1, or 2 messages SPDp=90-100

5) Encryption metric $w_p$=60

| | *Cp* | *SPDp* |
|---|---|---|
| *No encryption* | *88* | *12* |
| *Key 64 bits* | *10* | *90* |
| *Key 128 bits* | *5* | *95* |
| *Not applicable* | *0* | *100* |

# Metrics analysis
## *1. approach, using linear calculation X_i^2 * w_i/ SUM(w_i)*

*SQRT(SUM)*

*30^2*40/155*

| | | Comp 1 | Comp 2 | Comp 3 | Comp 4 | Sum | Cp | SPDp |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Scenario 1 "privacy" | Conf. A | 232 | 52 | 0 | 10 | 294 | 17 | **83** |
| | Conf. B | **960** | 52 | 4 | 10 | 1 025 | 32 | 68 |
| | Conf. C | 434 | 52 | 18 | 10 | 513 | 23 | 77 |
| Scenario 2 "parents" | Conf. D | **1 735** | 217 | 1 | 39 | 1 992 | 45 | 55 |
| | Conf. E | 1 735 | 217 | 73 | 39 | 2 064 | 45 | 55 |
| | Conf. F | 1 778 | 217 | 165 | 39 | 2 198 | 47 | 53 |
| Scenario 3 "emergency" | Conf. G | 1 735 | 228 | 4 | 2 998 | 4 964 | 70 | 30 |
| | Conf. H | 1 735 | 228 | 361 | 2 998 | 5 322 | 73 | 27 |
| | Conf. I | **1 778** | 228 | 1 171 | **2 998** | 6 174 | 79 | **21** |

sum of weight: 155

# Multi-Metrics subsystem evaluation

| | Criticality | | | | | $SPD_P$ | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | C1 | C2 | C3 | C4 | Sub-Sys. | | Scen. 1 | Scen. 2 | Scen. 3 |
| $SPD_{Goal}$ | | | | | | | (s,80,d) | (s,50,d) | (s,5,d) |
| Multi-Metrics Elements | M1 | M2 | M3 ∩ M4 | M5 | C1... ∩ ...C4 | | | | |
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| Conf. G | 82 | 42 | 4 | 88 | 70 | 30 | 🔴 | 🟡 | 🔴 |
| Conf. H | 82 | 42 | 40 | 88 | 73 | 27 | 🔴 | 🟡 | 🔴 |
| Conf. I | 83 | 42 | 72 | 88 | Alarm | 21 | 🔴 | 🟡 | 🟡 |

# Conclusions

- SHIELD is the security methodology developed through JU Artemis/ECSEL
- Security, Privacy, and Dependability (SPD) assessment
- Social Mobility Use-Case: loan a car
  - ➡ «behave» - full privacy awareness -> $\mathbf{SPD}_{goal}$ = (s,**80**,d)
  - ➡ «speeding» - limited privacy -> $\mathbf{SPD}_{goal}$ = (s,**50**,d)
  - ➡ «accident» - no privacy -> $\mathbf{SPD}_{goal}$ = (s,**5**,d)
- 11 configurations assessed
  - ➡ 2 satisfy «behave», 3 satisfy «speeding», 0 satisfies «accident»
- Goal: apply SHIELD methodology in various industrial domains

nSHIELD