

UiO **Department of Technology Systems University of Oslo**

TEK5530 - Measurable Security for the Internet of Things

L11 – Multi-Metrics Analysis

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http://loTSec.no , #loTSec, #loTSecNO

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Overview

- Learning outcomes L11
- Use case (application) SocialMobility
- Values for Security, Privacy
- Analyse the system of systems
- Identify Security, Privacy attributes and functionality for a sub-system
- Multi-Metrics analysis
- Future work







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Expected Learning outcomes


- Having followed the lecture, you can
- establish a scenario/use case
- provide application examples
- provide reasons for the choice of s,p,d
- establish a system architecture with sub-systems and components
- explain the Multi-Metrics method
- (prepare for your own work)







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[source: http://securityontology.sba-research.org/]






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Roadmap for a more secure and privacy-aware society

- "Vulnerability analysis" is not sufficient
 - novel threats occur
 - installation base for 5-20 years
 - example: increase in DDoS attack capability




Notable 2016 IoT botnet DDOS attacks

Business advantage for European industries Security classes/levels

> . https://securityintelligence.com/the-weaponization-of-iot-riseof Eks 530 gb Marti-Metrics









Multi-Metrics Methodology for Assessment of Security, Privacy, and Dependability (SPD)

» Iñaki Equia, Frode van der Laak, Seraj Fayyad, Cecilia Coveri, Konstantinos Fysarakis, George Hatzivasilis, Balázs Berkes, Josef Noll Thanks to our colleagues from SHIELD for the collaboration



Feb2015


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
- **Accountable security**
- Assessment
 - Comparison desired Class vs Calculated class
- Modelling
 - SPD Metrics, from criticality to SPD value
- Framework
 - Examples of applicability
- Measurable Security

Security is not 0/1









to measurable: security, privacy and dependability


SPD level	SPD vs S
(67,61,47)	(●,
(67,61,47)	(●,
(31,33,63)	(●,





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Methodology: From System description to SPD level



- System: Automatic Meter System (AMS) consists of reader (AMR), aggregator, communications, storage, user access
- Sub-systems: AMR consists of power monitor, processing unit, communication unit
- Component: AMR communication contains of a baseband processing, antenna, wireless link
- Configuration Parameter: Wireless link: f=868 MHz, output power=?, Encryption=?



Run SPD Multimetrics analysis







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Measurable Security, Privacy, Dependability (SPD)

- Focus on «entry the industrial market»
- Industry «needs security» with entry models


Scenario







- System Security, Privacy and Dependability is assessed
 - Application SPD_{Goal}
 - SPD_{System} asessment
 - Comparison SPD_{Level}






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Measurable Security

- From people defined security classes
- To automated security decisions
 - through metrics assessment



based on

 security, privacy and dependability (SPD) functionalities

System




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Multi-Metrics - system composition

- - security
 - privacy
 - dependability








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
Multi-Metrics components

- Components have a security, privacy and dependability factor.
- Metrics assess the components









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


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Example: Privacy in a Social Mobility Use Case

- Social Mobility, including social networks, here: loan of vehicle
- Shall I monitor the user?







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
Privacy: Loan of vehicle

- Scenario 1: privacy ensured, «user behaves»
- Scenario 2: track is visible as user drives too fast
- Scenario 3: Crash, emergency actions



operations on building places, add sensors (eye control)





Industrial applicability: Truck operation (Volvo), Autonomous



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
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Social Mobility Components

Applicable nSHIELD Components (Px):

- Lightweight Cyphering (P1) • 1-
- 2-Key exchange (P2)
- 3-Anonymity & Location Privacy (P10)
- Automatic Access Control (P11) • 4-
- 5-Recognizing DoS Attack (P13)
- 6-Intrusion Detection System (P15)
- 7-Attack surface metrics (P28)
- Embedded SIM, sensor (P38) • 8-
- 9-Multimetrics (P27)










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Communication Subsystem Metrics

(SPD) Metrics

- ➡ Port metric
- Communication channel
- ➡ GPRS message rate
- ➡ SMS rate
- Encryption







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Social Mobility - Examples of Metrics

GPRS message rate metric

Parameter(sec)	0.5	1	2	5	10	20	60	120	∞
Ср	80	60	45	30	20	15	10	5	0

Encryption metric

Parameter	No encryption	Key 64 bits	Key 128 bits	Not applicable
Ср	88	10	5	0



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Metrics weighting

Port (M1), w = 100Communication channel (M2), w = 100GPRS message rate (M3), w = 80SMS message rate (M4), w = 20Encryption (M5), w = 100







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Multi-Me

etrics	SU	bsy	Sitic	ality	evalu	ati	on s	SPD_P	
	C1	C2	C3	C4	Sub-Sys.		Scen. 1	Scen. 2	Scen. 3
SPD_{Goal}							(s, 80, d)	(s, 50, d)	(s, 5, d)
Multi-			M3		C1				
Metrics	M1	M2	\cap	M5	\cap				
Elements			M4		C4		and the second second		
Conf. A	30	20	0	5	17	83		•	•
Conf. B	61	20	4	5	32	68		•	
Conf. C	41	20	9	5	23	77			
Conf. D	82	41	2	10	45	55			
Conf. E	82	41	18	10	45	55			
Conf. F	83	41	27	10	47	53	•		
Conf. G	82	42	4	88	70	30			
Conf. H	82	42	40	88	73	27		•	
Conf. I	83	42	72	88	Alarm	21		•	





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Privacy Scenarios - to trigger your ideas

- Loan of the car (normal operation, speeding, accident)
- The home medical equipment
 - Transmitting the data
 - Applications storing and handling the data
- Networked cameras and microphones
 - Privacy of persons captured
 - Who can access the data





- What kind of operations can be performed on the data
- Speaking & listening doll
 - Microphone recording everything in the room (children playing, grown-ups discussing)
- FitBit & Smart Watches
 - sleeping cycle
 - → puls, fitness
- your take



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Privacy measuring in Smart Grids and Energy metering

- Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMI) and Smart Meters are deployed in Norway to automatically and continuously measure energy consumption.
- There are many Privacy Concerns around these:
 - How much Private information can be extracted from this data ?
 - How well is this data anonymized ?
 - How well can we measure the privacy implications of such Smart Systems ?

• Papers to start from (also see who cites these on scholar.google.com):


- "Smart grid privacy via anonymization of smart metering data." by Costas Efthymiou and Georgios Kalogridis, in IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), 2010.
- "Influence of data granularity on smart meter privacy." by Günther Eibl and Dominik Engel in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid 6.2 (2015): 930-939. "Do not snoop my habits: preserving privacy in the smart grid." by Félix Gómez Mármol; Christoph Sorge; Osman Ugus; Gregorio Martínez Pérez in
- IEEE Communications Magazine 50.5 (2012).
- "Achieving anonymity via clustering." by Aggarwal, et al. in Proceedings of the twenty-fifth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems. ACM, 2006.

Algorithms. Springer, Cham, 2016. 237-251.

where the use of clustering for data privacy." by Torra, Vicenç, Guillermo Navarro-Arribas, and Klara Stokes in Unsupervised Learning









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Privacy measuring in Smart Buildings for Air Quality

- Multiple sensors are used to monitor air quality in Smart office buildings or industrial facilities. Various privacy sensitive data are being collected and analysed, ranging from office employees to secret industrial processes.
- There are many Privacy Concerns around these:
 - How much Information should be gathered for the task that is intended ?
 - Can the indoor location of people and processes be inferred; how precisely ?
 - If anonymized and minimised, can Machine Learning algorithms still perform well ?

• Papers to start from (also see who cites these on scholar.google.com):

- "<u>A terminology for talking about privacy by data minimization.</u>" by Pfitzmann, Andreas, and Marit Hansen. (2010).
- "Monitoring Data Minimisation." by Pinisetty S, Antignac T, Sands D, Schneider G. (2018)
- "A general survey of privacy-preserving data mining models and algorithms." by Charu C. Aggarwal and S. Yu Philip in book Privacy-preserving data <u>mining</u>. (2008)
- "A survey of computational location privacy." by Krumm, John in Personal and Ubiquitous Computing 13.6 (2009): 391-399.
- Book 2005: <u>Privacy, security and trust within the context of pervasive computing</u>

Solutifying location privacy." by Shokri, Reza, et al. in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (2011) *Communications* Security. (2013)




- indistinguishability: Differential privacy for location-based systems." by Andrés, Miguel E., et al. in ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer &



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Health Scenario, health record exchange





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Privacy-specific parameters


- Please discuss with your neighbours a) other scenarios (6 min)
 - b) what are the important privacy parameters (5 min)
- Examples of privacy parameters
 - which data are collected
 - sharing to my phone, my cloud, public cloud,...
 - data communication integrity and storage
 - further distribution of data, ownership of data, further processing






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Privacy Labelling http://PrivacyLabel.loTSec.no






- can't measure" Galileo
- Privacy today
 - based on lawyer terminology
 - 250.000 words on app terms and conditions
- Privacy tomorrow
 - A++: sharing with no others
 - → A: ...
 - C: sharing with
- The Privacy label for apps and devices

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"Measure, what you can measure - Make measurable, what you



Appfail Report – Threats to Consumers in Mobile Apps

The Norwegian Consumer Council analysed the terms of 20 mobile purpose is to uncover potential threats to consumer protection hidden in the end-user terms and privacy policies of apps.







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The economic perspective of Privacy Label

- The big 5 IT companies have a GDP as big as that of France
- Amazon largest sector in terms of revenue is selling of data
 - → 20% of revenue
- How can SMEs compete?
 - Each service and device gets a privacy label
- Four areas for Privacy Label
 - which data are collected
 - sharing to my phone, my cloud, public cloud,...


data communication integrity and storage

further distribution of data, ownership of data, further processing



Privacy Label (A-F)

- easy visibility
- customer focus
- transparent



privacylabel.loTSec.no Mar2019, Josef Noll, Gy. Kálmán



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Run-Through Example - Car loan, privacy considerations



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




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
Multi-Metrics_{v2} - system composition


- here: communication sub-system vehicle <-> backend
 - Port metric
 - Communication channel
 - GPRS message rate
 - SMS rate
 - Encryption













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Social Mobility Configuration

- Conf. A: The ES does not send any SMS; GPRS data are encrypted with 128 bits key. The ES accepts remote configuration from the BE.
- Conf. B: same as above, except ES sends a keep alive message to the BE every 120 seconds.
- Conf. C: same as above, except BE sends messages to the ES and the last one replies every 60 seconds.
- remote configuration from the BE.
- speed information every 5 seconds.
- of the MC are sent from the ES to the BE. ES accepts remote configuration from BE.
- Conf. H: same as above, except ES sends location and speed information to the BE every 2 seconds.

• Conf. I: same as above, except BE sends messages to the ES and the last one replies with location and speed information every 0.5 seconds.



• Conf. D: The ES sends an SMS to parents; GPRS data to the BE are encrypted with 64 bits key. ES accepts

• Conf. E: same as above, except ES sends location and speed information to the BE every 10 seconds. • Conf. F: same as above, except BE sends messages to the ES and the last one replies with location and

• Conf. G: ES sends one SMS to parents, another to emergency services. Unencrypted data about the status







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Metrics & weight (only privacy)

1) Port metric, weight $w_p=40$

	Ср	SPDp
SNMP (UDP) 161 in the ES	40	60
SNMP trap (UDP) 162 in the BE	60	40
SSH (TCP) 23 in the ES	30	70
SMS	80	20

2) Communication channel metric, weight w_p=20

GPRS with G SMS over GS

5) Encryption metric $w_p=60$

		Ср	SPDp
	No encryption	88	12
	Key 64 bits	10	90
	Key 128 bits	5	95
1	Not applicable	0	100
/			

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	Ср	SPDp
SEA/3	20	80
SM with A5/1	40	60

4) SMS message rate metric $w_p=20$ 0,1, or 2 messages SPDp=90-100

3) GPRS message rate metric $w_p = 80$

messaae delav	Ср	SPDp
0.5 sec	80	20
1 sec	60	40
2 sec	45	65
5 sec	30	70
10 sec	20	80
20 sec	15	85
60 sec	10	90
120 sec	5	95
No messaaes	0	100



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Metrics analysis 1. approach, us


30^2*40/155

h, using linear calculation X_i^2 * w_i/ SUM(w_i)											
-							SQR	- Т(SUM) Ср			
			Comp 1	Comp 2	Comp 3	Comp 4	Sum	Ċp ´	SPD		
155		Conf. A	232	52	0	10	294	17	83		
	"privacy"	Conf. B	960	52	4	10	1 025	32	68		
		,	434	52	18	10	513	23	77		
	Scenario 2	Conf. D	1 735	217	1	39	1 992	45	55		
	"parents"	Conf. E	1 735	217	73	39	2 064	45	55		
		Conf. F	1 778	217	165	39	2 198	47	53		
	Scenario 3	Conf. G	1 735	228	4	2 998	4 964	70	30		
	"emergency	Conf. H	1 735	228	361	2 998	5 322	73	27		
	:	Conf. I	1 778	228	1 1 7 1	2 998	6 174	79	21		
sum of we	ignt: 155							Constant and the			



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Multi-Me

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Conf. H	82	42	40	88	73	27		•	
Conf. I	83	42	72	88	Alarm	21		•	









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Conclusions

- SHIELD is the security methodology developed through JU Artemis/ECSEL Security, Privacy, and Dependability (SPD) assessment
- Social Mobility Use-Case: loan a car

 - where we wave a state of the state of th «speeding» - limited privacy -> SPD_{goal} = (s,50,d) «accident» - no privacy -> SPD_{goal} = (s,5,d)
- 11 configurations assessed

2 satisfy «behave», 3 satisfy «speeding», 0 satisfies «accident» Goal: apply SHIELD methodology in various industrial domains










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Upcoming lectures





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