Adaptive Security Model for IoTSec

IoTSec Project 248113/O70 General Meeting

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Anticipatory adaptive security + semantic provability



Later this will be integrated with machine learning for Integrated analysis and decision making, and optimized adaptation

Feedback control loops: Monitor-Analyze-Adapt (PDCA)

- Monitor (Check)
  - Application requirements
  - Environment sensors
  - Network environment
  - User context
- Analyze (Plan)
  - Inference
  - Uncertain reasoning
  - Economic models
  - Rules and policies
  - Game theory
  - Risk analysis
- Adapt (Do & Act)
  - Risk analysis
  - Decision theory
  - Hypothesis generation
  - Managed things
  - Record strategies
  - Inform users or sys admin

Monitor

- Collects relevant data that reflect the current state of the system
  - environmental sensors
  - other sources
- Questions
  - What is the required sample rate
  - How reliable is the sensor data
  - Is there a common event format across sensors
  - What is granularity of self-monitoring

Analyze

- Analyzes the collected data
- Questions
  - How is the current state of the system inferred?
  - How much past state may be needed in the future?
  - What data need to be archived for validation and verification?
  - How faithful is the model to the real world?
  - Can an adequate model be derived from the available sensor data?

Adapt

- Makes decisions about how to adapt in order to reach a desirable state and implements the decisions via available actuators and effectors
  - **Decide**: Risk analysis, Decision theory, Hypothesis generation
  - **Act**: Managed things, Record strategies, Inform users or sys admin
- Questions
  - How is the future state of the system inferred?
  - How is a decision reached (e.g., with off-line simulation or utility/goal functions)?
  - What are the priorities for adaptation across multiple control loops and within a single control loop?

Adapt …

- More questions?
  - When should the adaptation be safely performed?
  - How do adjustments of different control loops interfere with each other?
  - Does centralized or decentralized controls help achieve the global goal?
  - Does the control system have sufficient command authority over the process — i.e., can the action be implemented using the available actuators and effectors?
- Caveat: Adaptors
  - Cannot blindly apply adaptations since it might have a negative impact on functionality or even worse it could create new faults altogether

Adaptive Human-Computer Interaction

- Analyzing feedback types from
  - human-computer interaction, collected information and how this is used in the adaptation
- Devising novel mechanisms for
  - exposing the control loops to the users, keeping the users of self-adapting systems “in the loop” to ensure their trust
- Visual feedback of the adaptation
- Give the users the option to
  - disable the self-adaptive features and
  - the system should not contradict this

To measure human behavior in a security context

- Taken verbatim from " Socio-Technical Security Metrics" seminar: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2015/4974/pdf/dagrep_v004_i012_p001_s14491.pdf
  - what behaviors we can expect to see;
  - what triggers behaviors;
  - what the range of behaviors is;
  - what behaviors we want to encourage or discourage;
  - what the differences between individual and group behaviors are;
  - what triggers for sharing are;
  - what attitudes lead to what behaviors.

Getting reliable data [Socio-Technical Security Metrics Seminar]

- They formulated the following problems and recommendations:
  - Use metrics that are as explicit as possible;
  - People collecting data need hands-on experience of risk analysis – this is currently often confused with requirements analysis;
  - Predict risk level after changes have been implemented;
  - Combine risk analysis with other techniques to check risk model;
  - Use two risk models – before and after;
  - Combine with other measures, e.g. vulnerability scans, to check predictions – program and functional testing.

Methodologies and methods

- Risk analysis (basis for security decision)
- Evolutionary theory (conflicting incentives)
- Control theory (attack strategies seeds)
- Distributed behavioral analysis (computational capabilities)
- Adaptive Systems and Interaction (Contextual intelligence) http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/groups/adapt/
- Machine learning (optimization), reinforcement learning and/or Inverse reinforcement learning (learning the reward function)
- Prosa (security protocol specification)

Evolutionary game theory

- bridges concepts from
  - biology
  - evolution
  - non-linear dynamics, and
  - game theory
- populations of players
  - different strategies
  - a process similar to natural selection is used to determine how the population evolves
- allows us to deal with evolutionary threats

Control theory

- The control loop
  - a central element of control theory
- control theory provides
  - well established mathematical models, tools, and techniques to analyze system performance, stability, sensitivity, or correctness
  - Instruction how to compute plans (sequences of actions) that are optimal with respect to maximizing an objective
- interactions of control loops
  - explicit and expose how these interactions are handled

The Prosa Process

Scope

Review documentation
Perform interviews
Identify critical sections

Deliveries:
System overview
Critical sections
Scope recommendation

Modeling

Detailed documentation review:
- System modeling
- Review with key personnel to Identify:
  1. Model updates
  2. Documentation errors
  3. Design errors

Deliveries:
Precise PROSA model providing:
- System overview
- Detailed system behavior
- Complete, uniform documentation
- Implementation errors identified

Security require-ments

Identify and validate information assets (critical information elements)
Model requirements

Deliveries:
Model with complete requirements including :
- Confidentiality goals
- Integrity goals

Threats

Perform eavesdropper simulation
Attack landscaping
Impersonation patterns

Deliveries:
Documentation of possible threats (potential attacks) with description of attack behavior

Risk Analysis

Threats overview
Decision making priorities

Deliveries:
Risk documentation for each potential threat

Critical sections identified

Detailed design documented in precise PROSA model



Complete, precise security requirements documentation



Issue descriptions for Library of attacks



Risk documentation for threats

Attack description	Likelihood	Impact
Network attack 1	High	Low
Network attack 2	Low	High
Intrusion attack 1	Very Low	Very High
Intrusion attack 2	Medium	High
Intrusion attack 3	Low	Medium

Discussions

- How should integrate with other activities
- Should we make our feedback control loops and their features explicit
- What activities and methods should we use in each loops
- Can you help us answer questions we have raised and for how many of them you can answer

WP2 – Inter-tasks research integration