

Universitetet

i Stavanger

Oct 2011, Josef Noll

University of Karlstad - Colloq. 10. Oct 2011


### Security, Privacy and Dependability in the Internet of Things

represented by: Josef Noll, Professor University of Oslo/UNIK josef@unik.no on behalf of the Center for Wireless Innovation Norway CWI Norway (http://cwin.no)

HØGSKOLEN I BER

下のたれのだ。
 Høgskolen i Telemark
 UNIVERSITETET I AGDER
 UNIVERSITETET I AGDER
 UNIVERSITETET

### Outlook



- Integrated operations: from oil and gas industry into the business of every sector
- Aspects of Integrated Operations
  - -trust-based security
  - -content-awareness (and context-awareness)
- Challenges in ICT security for the Internet of Things (IoT)
  - -Security, privacy and dependability in sensor systems
  - -Heterogeneous infrastructures
  - -security metrics

UNIVERSITETET I AGDER

• Example: Artemis pSHIELD project

NTNI

-Use case: Railway data through Telenor Objects Shepherd platform

UNIVERSITETET

The Center for Wireless Innovation Norway - CWIN.no - Enabling Collaborative Research

Høgskolen i Telemark


2

uS

#### Integrated operations

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In the Petroleum industry, Integrated operations (IO) refers to new work processes and ways of doing oil and gas exploration and production,




Trondheim

2007 Semantic Technology Conference



#### 40 bill US\$ added economic value (now-2015) Integrated Operations on the NCS - OLF numbers

- Increased production (5 -10 %)
  - Real time coordination between offshore and onshore
  - Real time simulation of process and operation data
- Increased reserves (5 -10 %)
  - Improved location of wells
  - Smart wells and real time management of reservoirs
- Reduced operation costs (30 50 %)
  - Conditioned based maintenance
  - Reduced use of personnel offshore
- Reduced drilling costs (30 50 %)
  - Real time optimized well trajectory
  - Fewer off-track
  - Reduced use of personnel offshore




source: Fjellheim&Norheim, Computas

Challenges in integrated operations

- Automatic detection of events
  - well, process, critical equipment
- Automatic evaluation of the effect of events
  - Production targets, costs

UNIVERSITETET I AGDER

- From corporate to equipment level
- Automatic generation of advices on how to manage events



ß

Automatic processing of events

 $\Box$  NTNU

 Automatic follow-up of events, e.g. actions required to handle events

The Center for Wireless Innovation Norway - CWIN.no - Enabling Collaborative Research BINbak, IBM

Ŷ

UNIVERSITETET

LOSLO


Høgskolen i Telemark

source: Kaare

Oct 2011, Josef Noll

Need for new & highly scalable technologies






### "Integrated Operations" in transport

- Missing: Integrated transport
  - –"From Oslo to Svolvær with train, flight, boat, bus"?
  - -combined travel Haugenstua to Mainz (flight & train)

UNIVERSITETET I AGDER

**D**NTNU

I OSLO



mandag 10. oktober 11

Høgskolen i Telemark

### Online traffic

- Example: 7 TOMTOM
- TomTom HD traffic in Nov 2007 using Vodafone network data in NL
- TomTom Live in Oct 2010

   using Telenor SIM in the Nordic Market
   update every 2nd minute
- API for 3rd party

UNIVERSITETET I AGDER

-Antenne Bayern: "more accurate"

The Center for Wireless Innovation Norway - CWIN.no - Enabling Collaborative Research

UNIVERSITETET

mandag 10. oktober 11

Høgskolen i Telemark


#### TomTom GO LIVE 100



8

uS

### Outlook



- Integrated operations: from oil and gas industry into the business of every sector
- Aspects of Integrated Operations
  - -trust-based security
  - -content-awareness (and context-awareness)
- Challenges in ICT security for the Internet of Things (IoT)
  - -Security, privacy and dependability in sensor systems
  - -Heterogeneous infrastructures
  - -security metrics

UNIVERSITETET I AGDER

• Example: Artemis pSHIELD project

NTNI

-Use case: Railway data through Telenor Objects Shepherd platform


UNIVERSITETET

The Center for Wireless Innovation Norway - CWIN.no - Enabling Collaborative Research

Høgskolen i Telemark

uS





10

Oct 2011, Josef Noll

trust-based security

UNIVERSITETET I AGDER

content-awareness (and context-awareness)

The Center for Wireless Innovation Norway - CWIN.no - Enabling Collaborative Research

UNIVERSITETET I OSLO


**D**NTNU

J


Universitetet i Stavanger


UNIK

UNIVERSITETSSTUDIEN



### **Content-awareness**





Content-awareness

UNIVERSITETET I AGDER

source: WWRF - outline - user profiling

J

υί ιικ

UNIVERSITETSSTUDIEN PÅ KJELLER

-urgent: "breaking the glass"

NTNU

The Center for Wireless Innovation Norway - CWIN.no - Enabling Collaborative Research

UNIVERSITETET


I OSLO

4

mandag 10. oktober 11

Høgskolen i Telemark

### Outlook



- Integrated operations: from oil and gas industry into the business of every sector
- Aspects of Integrated Operations
  - -trust-based security
  - -content-awareness (and context-awareness)
- Challenges in ICT security for the Internet of Things (IoT)
  - -Security, privacy and dependability in sensor systems
  - -Heterogeneous infrastructures
  - -security metrics

UNIVERSITETET I AGDER

• Example: Artemis pSHIELD project

NTNI


-Use case: Railway data through Telenor Objects Shepherd platform

UNIVERSITETET

The Center for Wireless Innovation Norway - CWIN.no - Enabling Collaborative Research

Høgskolen i Telemark

uS




### Security Challenges in embedded ICT

- Security, here

   –security (S)
   –privacy (P)
   –dependability (D)
- across the value chain
  - –from sensors to services
- measurable security?

UNIVERSITETET I AGDER



ß

Universitetet

UNIK

UNIVERSITETSSTUDIEN PÅ KJELLER

The Center for Wireless Innovation Norway - CWIN.no - Enabling Collaborative Research

4

UNIVERSITETET

I OSLO

A

**D**NTNU

mandag 10. oktober 11

Høgskolen i Telemark



All rights reserved © 2011

# Measurement of Security, Privacy and Dependability (SPD) functions

**SPD Function** : a software, hardware or firmware component, that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the security, privacy and dependability policy.

To obtain

SPD level : a quantification of SPD function —— expressing the protection which can provide against Faults (FUA, NFUA and NHMF)





All rights reserved © 2011

#### With our calculation method we obtained the SPD level:

- Gathered following an international standard: ISO 15408
- Consistently measured, without subjective criteria
- Expressed as a cardinal number
- •Contextually specific, relevant enough to make decisions


SPD level is not expressed using at least one unit of measure, such as "defects", "hours" or "dollars"



### SPD Metrics specification: SPD functions for reducing FUA metric construction method



All rights reserved © 2011






### SPD Metrics specification: SPD functions for reducing metric construction method



				Factor	Value
				Elapsed Time	
				<= one day	0
Dece of Kingersteelers				<= one week	1
Base of Knowledge				<= one month	4
		1		<= two months	7
				<= three months	10
	Essential to build			<= four months	13
	Ļ			<= five months	15
Attack scenarios				<= six months	17
Allack Sce	enanos			> six months	19
				Expertise	
	ith	Factors to be considered		Layman	0
	with		• Elapsed Time • Expertise	Proficient	3*(1)
	Ļ			Expert	6
Calculated attack potential			Knowledge of functionality	Multiple experts	8
			Window of opportunity     Equipment	Knowledge of functionality	
				Public	0
	where			Restricted	3
	WIICIC			Sensitive	7
				Critical	11
	↓ 			Window of	
Minimum attack potential value to				Unnecessary / unlimited access	0
exploit a vulnerability = SPD Value				Easy	1
-	-			Moderate	4
				Difficult	10
				Unfeasible	25**(2)
				Equipment	
				Standard	0
				Specialised	4(3)
				Bespoke	7
				Multiple bespoke	9
ELD Project				L	18

### Outlook



- Integrated operations: from oil and gas industry into the business of every sector
- Aspects of Integrated Operations
  - -trust-based security
  - -content-awareness (and context-awareness)
- Challenges in ICT security for the Internet of Things (IoT)
  - -Security, privacy and dependability in sensor systems
  - -Heterogeneous infrastructures
  - -security metrics

UNIVERSITETET I AGDER

• Example: Artemis pSHIELD project

NTNI

-Use case: Railway data through Telenor Objects Shepherd platform

UNIVERSITETET


The Center for Wireless Innovation Norway - CWIN.no - Enabling Collaborative Research

Høgskolen i Telemark

uS

#### **Middleware Contextualization**






#### Semantic in a nutshell (see prototype)



All rights reserved © 2011


Ontology logical representation: each concept is modeled and the relations are identified in order to have the logical chains that enables the SPD-aware composability





All rights reserved © 2011

In order to realize the pSHIELD key concepts, the tasks are mapped and justified in this way:



#### **Overview - prototypical demonstrations**



- SPD levels are achieved through specific configurations by the overlay
- Nano-Micro-Personal-M2M Platform
- Monitoring trains with WSNs
- FPGA Power Node Prototype
- Cognitive Radio Node Prototype
- Also prototypes for
- pSHIELD semantic model prototype (ontology)
- Policy-based management and hyb automata model





#### **Pilot: Semantic Overlay and Composability**




All rights reserved © 2010-2012

- SPD levels are achieved through specific configurations by the overlay
  - demonstrating the behaviour of the pSHIELD middleware
  - demonstrating SPD-driven composability
  - using metrics-formulation from WP2



#### Pilot: Nano-Micro-Personal-M2M platform

- Nano-Micro-Personal-M2M Platform
  - security interworking between embedded sensors and Telecom service platform
  - Identify SPD functions in an integrated embedded sensor testbed
  - opens for SPD metrics based composability



Jernba



#### Pilot: Monitoring trains with WSNs


- Monitoring trains with WSNs
  - identity requirements of real-world applications
  - Identify SPD functions in an integrated embedded sensor testbed
  - opens for SPD metrics based composability



All rights reserved © 2010-2012

#### **Pilot: FPGA Power Node Prototype**


- FPGA Power Node Prototype
  - modular system reconfiguration
  - self-dependability at node layer
  - hardware and software security and privacy service provider





#### Pilot: Cognitive Radio Node Prototype

- Cognitive Radio Node Prototype
  - reconfigurable radio components with waveform Tx parameters
  - Sensing mechanisms to acquire awareness about resources
  - Cognitive algorithms elaborating available resources
  - Embedded platform adaptation for validation of algorithms



PCB OMBRA-pSHIELD – OMAP uP (18x68 mm) WCP (1K pieces) =~150 Euro Computational Power 5X



#### Oct 2011, Josef Noll


29

#### Integrated Operations for Telenor Objects

- Telenor Object's Shepherd platform contains SPD features
  - device ID
  - encryption
- Ongoing the Shepherd platform to cope with
  - role-based access for guests, suppliers
  - identification of security threats
- Contribute to ETSI TS102.690 for M2M functionality
  - extension toward heterogeneous environments

UNIVERSITETET I AGDER

NTNU



uS

Universitetet i Stavanger











The Center for Wireless Innovation Norway - CWIN.no - Enabling Collaborative Research

LOSLO

Høgskolen i Telemark mandag 10. oktober 11

### Conclusions

- Security, privacy and dependability
- Sensor systems
- Heterogeneous infrastructures
- The value of integrated operations
- oil & gas: Billions of US\$/year
- **Integrated Operations**
- for the whole privat sector
- for the public sector
- **Open Issues**
- trust-based security
- content-awareness (and contextawareness)


NTNU

I OSLO

- security metrics







October 2010, Josef Noll

CM

## My special thanks to



- JU Artemis and the Research Councils of the participating countries (IT, HE, PT, SL, NO, ES)
- Andrea Fiaschetti for the semantic middleware and ideas
- Inaki Eguia Elejabarrieta, Andrea Morgagni, Francesco Flammini, Renato Baldelli, Vincenzo Suraci for the Metrices

- Sarfraz Alam (UNIK) and Geir Harald Ingvaldsen (JBV) for the train demo
- Zahid Iqbal and Mushfiq Chowdhury for the semantics
- Hans Christian Haugli and Juan Carlos Lopez Calvet for the Shepherd interfaces
- Przemyslaw Osocha for running the project

HØGSKOLEN I BERGEN

UNIVERSITETET

 and all those I have forgotten to mention

October 2010, Josef Noll



Universitetet

i Stavanger