

IoT DDoS Attacks Detection based on SDN

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Why DDoS Attack on IoT

- On Friday, October 21 2016, a series of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks caused widespread disruption of legitimate internet activity in the US.
- The attacks were perpetrated by directing huge amounts of bogus traffic at targeted servers, namely those belonging to Dyn, a company that is a major provider of DNS services to other companies.
- This made it hard for some major websites to work properly, including Twitter, Pinterest, Reddit, GitHub, Etsy, Tumblr, Spotify, PayPal, Verizon, Comcast, and the Playstation network.
- The attacks were made possible by the large number of unsecured internet-connected digital devices, such as home routers and surveillance cameras.


¹.<https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/10/24/10-things-know-october-21-iot-ddos-attacks/>

Why DDoS Attack on IoT

- One of the most important changes, the rising use of compromised Internet of Things (IoT) devices in botnet operations.
- The IBM X-Force team has been tracking the threat from weaponized IoT devices, also known as thingbots in 2016.
- In October 2016, reports of an IoT DDoS [botnet attack](#) against a different target revealed an approximately 200 percent size increase over the attack reported in June 2016.


¹. <https://securityintelligence.com/the-weaponization-of-iot-rise-of-the-thingbots/>

Why DDoS Attack on IoT




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IoT Architecture




1. Suo, H., Wan, J., Zou, C., & Liu, J. (2012, March). Security in the internet of things: a review. In Computer Science and Electronics Engineering (ICCSEE), 2012 international conference on (Vol. 3, pp. 648-651). IEEE.

IoT Security Solution




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IoT Security Solution



1. Jing, Q., Vasilakos, A. V., Wan, J., Lu, J., & Qiu, D. (2014). Security of the internet of things: Perspectives and challenges. *Wireless Networks*, 20(8), 2481-2501.

DDoS Attack



1. Sonar, K., & Upadhyay, H. (2014). A survey: DDOS attack on Internet of Things. International Journal of Engineering Research and Development, 10(11), 58-63.

DDoS Attack Types

- UDP flood
- ICMP/PING flood
- SYN flood
- Ping of Death
- Zero-day DDoS

1. Sonar, K., & Upadhyay, H. (2014). A survey: DDOS attack on Internet of Things. International Journal of Engineering Research and Development, 10(11), 58-63.

DDoS ATTACK ON IOT

DDoS on Perception Layer

- RFID Jamming
- RFID Kill Command Attack
- RFID De-synchronizing Attack

1. Sonar, K., & Upadhyay, H. (2014). A survey: DDOS attack on Internet of Things. International Journal of Engineering Research and Development, 10(11), 58-63.

DDoS ATTACK ON IOT

DDoS on Perception Layer

- 802.15.4: Wide-Band Denial and Pulse Denial
- 802.15.4: Node-Specific and Message-Specific Denial
- 802.15.4: Bootstrapping Attacks

1. Sonar, K., & Upadhyay, H. (2014). A survey: DDOS attack on Internet of Things. International Journal of Engineering Research and Development, 10(11), 58-63.

DDoS ATTACK ON IOT

DDoS on Network Layer

- Flooding Attacks
e.g.: UDP flood, ICMP flood, DNS flood etc.
- Reflection-based flooding Attacks
e.g.: Smurf attack
- Protocol Exploitation flooding attacks
e.g.: SYN flood, TCP SYN-ACK flood, ACK PUSH flood etc.
- Amplification-b
e.g.: BOTNET

1. Sonar, K., & Upadhyay, H. (2014). A survey: DDOS attack on Internet of Things. International Journal of Engineering Research and Development, 10(11), 58-63.


DDoS ATTACK ON IOT

DDoS on Application Layer

- Reprogramming Attack
- Path based DoS

1. Sonar, K., & Upadhyay, H. (2014). A survey: DDOS attack on Internet of Things. International Journal of Engineering Research and Development, 10(11), 58-63.

DDoS Attack Mitigation based on SDN



Why SDN?

- SDN Is integrated and multiple layer solution.
- SDN Logically has one automated control center.
- SDN Accepts telemetry from multiple sources.
- Multivendor interoperability.
- SDN is suitable for having a timely detection solution.

SDN-based Mitigation


Radware



<https://www.radware.com/Solutions/SDN/>

SDN-based Mitigation

Radware



<https://www.radware.com/Solutions/SDN/>

SDN-based Mitigation


Radware



<https://www.radware.com/Solutions/SDN/>

SDN-based Mitigation

Flow-aware Real-time
SDN Analytics (FRSA)



<http://blog.sflow.com/2014/02/flow-aware-real-time-sdn-analytics-frsa.html>

SDN-based Mitigation Challenges

- DDoS usually do not come from a single identified source.
 - makes remediation very difficult without also affecting legitimate traffic.
 -
- DDoS appears either very suddenly.
 - thus requiring fast reaction to counter their effects.
 - very slow reaction makes the detection even more complicated.

SDN-based Mitigation

- Stateless
 - Switches just send data to the controller.
 - Controller handles analyzing, detection and mitigation.
- Stateful
 - delegate as much computation as possible to the switches without compromising their performance.
 - letting the controller being only in charge of mitigation .

SDN-based Mitigation

- Stateless
 - Does not have fast and timely reaction.
 - Not efficient.
 - Not scalable.
- Stateful
 - Fast and timely reaction.
 - Less traffic load on the controller.

Stateful Method

Stateful method has three main steps:

- Monitoring
- Detection
- Mitigation

Stateful Method

Monitoring Methods:

- Native
 - overhead on the flow tables.
 - need to add more monitoring rules (max length is 3000 rules).
- Sflow
 - periodically take a sample and send the predefined info to the controller.
 - The sample time and the data is important and has a direct effect on the control band overhead.

Stateful Method


Monitoring Methods:

- StateSec
 - use the state and flow tables in an OpenState-compliant switch to independently from the forwarding rules:
 - list features
 - count the exact number of times they appear

Boite, J., Nardin, P. A., Rebecchi, F., Bouet, M., & Conan, V. (2017). StateSec: Stateful Monitoring for DDoS Protection in Software Defined Networks.

Stateful Method


StateSec



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Stateful Method

Anomaly Detection Methods:



R. Aryan, H.R Shahryari. StateSec: Botnet Detection Based on Behavioral Pattern and Misuse Detection. 18th Computer Society Of Iran Annual Conference, Sharif University of Technology, 2013.

Stateful Method

Anomaly Detection Methods:


- Clustering
 - ✓ Number of sent packets for each connection
 - ✓ Size of data which has been transferred
 - ✓ Connection start time
 - ✓ Connection duration
 - ✓ Destination port number

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Stateful Method

Anomaly Detection Met

- Clustering




From Zou and Lee

R. Aryan, H.R Shahryari. StateSec: Botnet Detection Based on Behavioral Pattern and Misuse Detection. 18th Computer Society Of Iran Annual Conference, Sharif University of Technology, 2013.

Stateful Method

Anomaly Detection Methods:

- Spindle Method



$\forall x, y, s, z \in \text{network model} \mid$


$$[\text{link}(x, y) \wedge \text{link}(x, s)] \wedge [\text{link}(y, z) \wedge \text{link}(s, z)] \Leftrightarrow \text{infected}(y, s)$$

R. Aryan, H.R Shahryari. StateSec: Botnet Detection Based on Behavioral Pattern and Misuse Detection. 18th Computer Society Of Iran Annual Conference, Sharif University of Technology, 2013.

Stateful Method

Anomaly Detection Methods:

- Spindle Method




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


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Stateful Method

Anomaly Detection Methods:

- Spindle Method



$\forall x, y, s, z$

$\in network\ model \mid [link(x, y) \wedge link(x, s)] \wedge [link(y, z) \wedge w(y, z)] \wedge [link(s, z) \wedge w(s, z)]$
 $\Leftrightarrow infected(y, s)$

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Stateful Method


Anomaly Detection Methods:

	Infected	Detected	False negative	False Positive
IRC bot	10	10	0	0
Http bot	10	10	0	0
Zeus	10	9	1	0
Spy bot	10	8	2	0

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Stateful Method

Mitigation Methods:



Xu, Yang, and Yong Liu. "DDoS attack detection under SDN context." Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2016-The 35th Annual IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 2016.

Stateful Method

Mitigation Methods:


$$\begin{array}{ll} & A \rightarrow B \\ A - \textit{Victim IP} = A' & A' \rightarrow B \\ B - \textit{Victim IP} = B' & A \rightarrow B' \end{array}$$

Stateful Method

Mitigation Methods:



- Subtraction Rules

Rule Number	500	1,000	2,000	5,000	10,000
Process Time (ms)	31,543	126,104	508,206	3.17×10^8	1.55×10^8



Aryan, R., Yazidi, A., Engelstad, P. E., & Kure, O. (2017, October). A General Formalism for Defining and Detecting OpenFlow Rule Anomalies. In 2017 IEEE 42nd Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN) (pp. 426-434). IEEE.

Conlusion



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9. Aryan, R, Shahryari, Hamid. R. StateSec: Botnet Detection Based on Behavioral Pattern and Misuse Detection. 18th Computer Society Of Iran Annual Conference, Sharif University of Technology, 2013.

**THANK
YOU...**