

SP3 - Technology Line

WP22 - Development and Implementation of Technologies

Roadmap towards a more secure and privacy-aware society

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secure connected trustable things



SCOTT has received funding from the Electronic Component Systems for European Leadership Joint Undertaking under grant agreement No 737422. This Joint Undertaking receives support from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme and Austria, Spain, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Netherlands, Belgium, Norway.



- Expectations when visiting our site:



- ongoing work:
- 16 use cases
- >40 Building Blocks
- >60 implementations

- Security - "SCOTT will present a framework for security"
- Safety - "The link between Safety and Security"
- Privacy - "Privacy label? - changing the rules of the game?"
- Usability - "Are solutions really usable?"
- Trustability - "Can I trust the system? - peak Norwegian?"

Focus in SP3: High-level perspective - Roadmap for European Industry

List of Building Blocks in SCOTT [edit]

The Building Blocks are sorted along WP 22: Technology Lines. These Technology Lines are: [hide]

- WP23: Security & Safety
- WP24: Distributed Cloud Integration
- WP25: Autonomy of Devices/Energy Efficiency of WSN
- WP26: Reference Architecture/Implementation

List of Building Blocks in SCOTT

- BB23.A Dependable Wireless Sensor Network, Leader: Teresa Riesgo, partners: INDRA, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Telenor, Wolfia (BB23.A)
- BB23.B End-to-end assured QoE, Leader: Xavier Alberti, partners: INDRA, CIT, KLAS, VEMCO (BB23.B)
- BB23.C Safety-critical applications via Satcom, Leader: Xavier Alberti, partners: INDRA (BB23.C)
- BB23.J Reinforcement of safety for traffic infrastructures, Leader: Francisco Parrilla, partners: INDRA, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Instituto Tecnológico de Informática, IK4-TEK, SAGOE (BB23.J)
- BB23.K Reliable Wireless PHY and MAC, Leader: Egoitz Arruti, partners: INDRA, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, SBA, Nokia, Virtual Vehicle Research Center (BB23.K)
- BB23.R Trust Trust Anchor and Trust Indicators, Leader: Marco Steger, partners: AVL, VEMCO, Politechnika Gdanska, IT, Nokia, Virtual Vehicle Research Center (BB23.R)
- BB3.1.B Dependable, Leader: Thuan, partners: UIO, Wolfia (BB3.1.B)
- BB24.A Remote Configuration of Infrastructure, Leader: Do van Thanh, partners: Telenor, HIC (BB24.A)
- BB24.B Addressing and Mobility Management, Leader: Pawel Czernecki, partners: FEV PL, Linz Center of Mechatronics GmbH, SBA (BB24.B)
- BB24.C Application of Security, Leader: Alexander Springer, partners: Johannes Kepler Universität, Linz Center of Mechatronics GmbH (BB24.C)
- BB24.D Adaptive network slicing, Leader: Do van Thanh, partners: Telenor, HIC (BB24.D)
- BB26.A Autonomous Wireless Network, Leader: Francisco Parrilla, partners: INDRA, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (BB26.A)
- BB26.B Cloud computing service platform, Leader: N. n., partners: AIT, AVL, CIS Cork, Nokia, Virtual Vehicle Research Center (BB26.B)
- BB26.C Smart routing for WSN on trains, Leader: Xavier Alberti, partners: INDRA, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (BB26.C)
- BB26.D Infrastructure design and security threat analysis, Leader: Ramiro Roble, partners: AVL, VEMCO, Politechnika Gdanska, INDRA, UIO, TUG, Johannes Kepler Universität, F-SECURE, SBA, HIOA, TU Delft, Virtual Vehicle Research Center, EyeNetworks (BB26.D)
- BB26.E Interoperability and secure cross-domain application development, Leader: Ramiro Roble, partners: AVL, VEMCO, Politechnika Gdanska, INDRA, UIO, TUG, Johannes Kepler Universität, F-SECURE, SBA, HIOA, TU Delft, Virtual Vehicle Research Center, EyeNetworks (BB26.E)
- BB26.F Measurable security and privacy, Leader: Toktam Ramezani, partners: AVL, VEMCO, Politechnika Gdanska, INDRA, UIO, TUG, Johannes Kepler Universität, F-SECURE, SBA, HIOA, TU Delft, Virtual Vehicle Research Center, EyeNetworks (BB26.F)
- BB26.G Privacy labels (A-F), Leader: Christian Johansen, partners: UIO (BB26.G)
- BB26.H Methods for wireless vehicular data links, Leader: Thomas Zemen, partners: AVL, VEMCO, Politechnika Gdanska, INDRA, UIO, TUG, Johannes Kepler Universität, F-SECURE, SBA, HIOA, TU Delft, Virtual Vehicle Research Center, EyeNetworks (BB26.H)

BB3.1.H Real-time configuration of secure zones, Leader: Ken Brown, partners: University College Cork, Tyco, VEMCO, Politechnika Gdanska (BB3.1.H)

BB3.1.J Reliable Wireless Multi-hop Communications, Leader: Salvador Santonja, partners: Instituto Tecnológico de Informática, AVL, INDRA (BB3.1.J)

BB3.1.L Routing and scheduling in real-time WSN, Leader: Rafael C. Socorro Hernández, partners: Tecnalia, Acciona (BB3.1.L)

BB3.1.M Safety WSN Adapter, Leader: Salvador Santonja, partners: Instituto Tecnológico de Informática, INDRA (BB3.1.M)

BB3.1.N SCOTT Security Library, Leader: Marco Steger, partners: AVL, VEMCO, Politechnika Gdanska, INDRA, UIO, TUG, Johannes Kepler Universität, F-SECURE, SBA, HIOA, TU Delft, Virtual Vehicle Research Center, EyeNetworks (BB3.1.N)

BB3.1.O Security Core - Identification, Authentication and Communication, Leader: Silke Holtmanns, partners: CISCO, EAB, F-SECURE, Linz Center of Mechatronics GmbH, PRE, UIO, SBA, VTT, VEMCO, Nokia, Virtual Vehicle Research Center (BB3.1.O)

BB3.1.P Spatial-based authorization and authentication, Leader: Mateusz Rzymowski, partners: VEMCO, Politechnika Gdanska, PRE, TYCO, University College Cork (BB3.1.P)

BB3.1.Q Towards a Safe Virtual Coupling, Leader: Francisco Parrilla, partners: INDRA, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, SAGOE (BB3.1.Q)

BB3.2.H Mobility Prediction, Leader: Ken Brown, partners: University College Cork, Tyco (BB3.2.H)

BB3.3.A Energy efficient security implementation in WSNs, Leader: Andreas Springer, partners: Johannes Kepler Universität, AVL, Linz Center of Mechatronics GmbH, SBA (BB3.3.A)

BB3.3.B Energy efficient & resource optimized component concepts for WSNs, Leader: Stefan Drude, partners: NXP NL, NXP AT, AVL (BB3.3.B)

BB3.3.C Energy storage for WSNs, Leader: Rafael C. Socorro Hernández, partners: UIO, Acciona, Tecnalia (BB3.3.C)

BB3.3.D Energy supply to on track segment, Leader: Javier Uceda, partners: Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, INDRA (BB3.3.D)


BB3.3.E Improved energy harvesting, Leader: Rafael C. Socorro Hernández, partners: Acciona, Tecnalia (BB3.3.E)

BB3.3.F In-vehicle WSN, Leader: Achim Berger, partners: Linz Center of Mechatronics GmbH, AVL, Johannes Kepler Universität, SBA (BB3.3.F)

BB3.3.G System level availability, Leader: Willem van Driel, partners: NXP AT, HH, VEMCO, Instituto Tecnológico de Informática, Politechnika Gdanska, AVL, Tecnalia, Acciona, CISCO, VTT, Philips Lightning, Nokia (BB3.3.G)


BB26.I - IoT4M over satellite, Leader: Xavier Alberti, partners: INDRA (BB26.I)

- Our **goals** with respect to **impact**
 - **change security** in Europe
 - key **selling arguments** for European industry
 - **Attraction** for SMEs
- Change Security in Europe
 - from attack-centric to **security classes**
- Key selling arguments for European industry
 - **applied Trust** through **Privacy Labels**
- Attraction for SMEs
 - **Architecture** with **APIs**



SCOTT vision per WP here: WP21, elaborated from WP28


- Problem situation
*An **elderly person** wants to live at home but his family is concerned about him or her **falling** and not being able to **get help**.*
- Basic Innovation
*The emergency unit consists of a **wireless sensor** that **automatically detects** a patient's fall along with critical body sensor information that **helps neighbours, relatives or the response team** to quickly respond.*
- Options include:
 - provides emergency responders **quick access** to the patient's **home**.
 - is **worn** directly on the **skin**
- Why SCOTT
 - focussing on a **trusted** cloud environment following the **user perceptions, moving away** from "everything goes to the ... cloud"
 - **TRUST**, here means
 - ▶ **privacy**: focussing on "**positive surveillance**", with the user having full control on the data, storage and distribution.
 - ▶ **reliability**: ensuring that the person carries the sensor and that the sensor **is working**



Domain specific applicability: Automotive

- Suggested methodology:
- The car as a system of systems


- For each subsystem, perform
- Security classes: 1-5
 - Exposure analysis of components
 - Impact analysis



Roadmap for a more secure and privacy-aware society


- “Vulnerability analysis” is not sufficient

- novel threats occur
- installation base for 5-20 years
- example: increase in DDoS attack capability



- Business advantage for European industries

- Security classes/levels



. <https://securityintelligence.com/the-weaponization-of-iot-rise-of-the-thingbots/>

Security Classes and measurable security

- **Security Class** in IoT

- Consequence
- Exposure

- **Consequence**

- as in risk map

- **Exposure**

- **Physical** exposure
 - ▶ people, building, physical ports,...
- **IT** exposure
 - ▶ ports, firewall, connectivity


New **postulate** of security class

Consequence				
5	Class 5	Class 5	Class 5	Class 5
4	Class 4	Class 4	Class 4	Class 5
3	Class 3	Class 3	Class 4	Class 4
2	Class 1	Class 3	Class 3	Class 3
1	Class 1	Class 1	Class 2	Class 2
Impact/Exposure	1	2	3	4+
Exposure				

Security Class

Upcoming work: Roadmap for technologies

- **Technology Roadmap** for uptake
 - Segment specific (car, home, cloud,)
 - best praxis
 - obstacles
- **Expected outcome** from SCOTT
 - harmonised Security functionality
 - Privacy labelling
 - Security classes
 - increased Trust
 - how represented in the specific domains



SP3 Conclusions

- SCOTT from a **helicopter perspective**
 - **overall vision** broken down into showcases
 - **interconnected** activities
 - contributor to EU **discussion**
- Example WP21
 - positive surveillance
 - privacy-aware
 - including neighbours, family, friends
- EU-wide **impact**
 - competitive advantage, e.g.:
 - ▶ **privacy label**
 - ▶ **security classes**
 - ▶ **security and privacy ontology**
 - ▶ **reference architectures** for sectors

New postulate of security class

5	Class 5	Class 5	Class 5	Class 5
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3	Class 3	Class 4	Class 4	Class 4
2	Class 1	Class 3	Class 3	Class 3
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Impact/Exposure	1	2	3	4+

