

Semantic Description and Semantic Modeling

IoTSec Kick-off meeting Halden

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WP1 Semantic system, application, and attack description

Understanding of

- **background.** What has been done before?
- **focus.** What are we interested in?
- **applications.** What kind of applications we are aiming at?
- **attacks.** What kind of attacks do we want to handle?
- **challenges.** What problems do we want to solve?
- **industry.** What problems are important to industry?

T1.1 Semantic description of infrastructure, attack detection, system view

We should consider

- **abstraction.** We need a general semantic model. We need to find suitable abstractions, not too low-level and not too high-level.
- **analysis.** How can we analyze the model to check properties.
- **attacks.** General modeling of attacks.
- **detection.** How to use our model in order to detect weaknesses wrt. attacks. How smart are the attackers?
- **tools.** Tools for doing the above tasks.
- **understanding** of components and communication

T1.2 Measurable: security, privacy and dependability, metrics

Objective: This task will establish the Multi-Metrics Model for the Smart Grid use cases. The task includes:

- adaptation to real world infrastructure
- analysis of most relevant sub-systems
- application-specific goals for security, privacy and dependability
- What metrics are suitable
- What security and privacy issues should be considered.
- How to evaluate these?
- Feedback from industry partners

Expected results T1.1

From our proposal:

- a non-trivial case study (M12),
- a minimum of 3 papers, including one journal paper (M12-36),
- the completion of a PhD candidate within the project period (M48).

The *Case Study* is the most urgent starting point:

- involving several partners
- should be relevant to our industry partners
- what is realistic in 12 month?
- should serve as a basis for further work and research
- should serve as a basis for papers

The case study should serve as unifying activity between the partners.
The problem question should come from industry.

Expected results T1.2

From our proposal:

- System analysis for main sub-systems on current infrastructure (M12),
- Identification of 3-5 use cases, to be further elaborated in T3.1 (M12),
- Feedback from industry on applicability of system analysis (M12),
- Extension of the Smart Grid system to 2+ new functionalities (M24),
- Identification of challenges for industrial applicability (M24).

3 first points most urgent. Should connect to the *Case Study* of T1.1.

Need to find

- main **security** issues in the case study
- main **privacy** issues in the case study
- main **dependability** issues in the case study
- suitable **metrics** to use in case study

All issues should be of interest to industry.

A possible modeling framework

The next foils present a possible framework for modeling for modeling and with state-of-the-art tools for advanced analysis.

Note:

- **executable modeling** , useful for experimentation and simulation.
- **analysis** of properties, useful for detection of attacks, for finding weaknesses of a model.
- **probabilistic modeling** possible.

The modeling framework of Rewriting Logic

High-level general language and tool

- for **modeling, prototyping and analysis**
- for **formalizing new (or old) paradigms** in computer science
- developed at SRI (Menlo Park), UIUC (Illinois), USA
- **Real-Time extension** by Peter Ölveczky (PMA)

Supporting

- **concurrency/parallelism, distribution,**
- **message passing, OO, actors,**
- **deterministic/non-deterministic behavior**
- **open/dynamic and mobile systems, software upgrades**
- **security issues**
- **cyber physical systems**

Executable modeling/programming through the language *Maude*

Main Elements of Maude

- pattern matching, rule based
- functional programming by equations ($=$)
- state changes by rules ($=>$)
- async. as well as sync. communication
- extension to real time
- extension to probabilistic behavior
- model checking and model exploration

Small Example: Broadcasting Protocol

```
subsort String ⟨Oid Msg .  
msg broadcast : Msg Oid → Msg .  
  
class Node | neighbors : OidSet, msgRead : Configuration .  
  
vars O O' : Oid . var OS : OidSet . var M : Msg .  
  
rl [startBroadcast] :  
broadcast (M, O)  
⟨O : Node | neighbors : OS, msgRead : none⟩ →  
⟨O : Node | msgRead : M⟩  
multimsg M from O to OS .  
  
rl [readAndForward] :  
(msg M from O to O')  
⟨O' : Node | neighbors : O ; OS, msgRead : none⟩ →  
⟨O' : Node | msgRead : M⟩  
multimsg M from O' to OS .  
  
rl [readSeenMsg] :  
(msg M from O to O')  
⟨O' : Node | neighbors : OS, msgRead : M⟩ →  
⟨O' : Node |⟩ .  
  
...
```

Broadcasting Protocol (2)

```
op msg_from_to_ : Msg Oid Oid → Msg [ctor] .
op multimsg_from_to_ : Msg Oid OidSet → Msg [ctor] .
var M : Msg . vars SENDER ARECEIVER : Oid .
var OTHER-RECEIVERS : OidSet .

eq multimsg M from SENDER to none = none .
eq multimsg M from SENDER to ARECEIVER ; OTHER-RECEIVERS =
  (msg M from SENDER to ARECEIVER)
  (multimsg M from SENDER to OTHER-RECEIVERS) .

op initState : → Configuration .
eq initState =
broadcast("eksempel-melding", "b")
{ "a" : Node | neighbors : "b" ; "e", msgRead : none }
{ "b" : Node | neighbors : "a" ; "d", msgRead : none }
{ "c" : Node | neighbors : "d", msgRead : none }
{ "d" : Node | neighbors : "b" ; "c" ; "e", msgRead : none }
{ "e" : Node | neighbors : "a" ; "d", msgRead : none } .

(rew initState .)
(search initState → ! C: Configuration .)
```

Example

Slightly more complex protocol from US used in industry.

Found errors with Maude analysis ([search](#))

because in Maude one may explore *all* possible executions and search for certain patterns, possibly specifying certain properties.

Similar experiences with

- Internet Explorer (US)
- Car software (Cruise control systems) (Japan)
- wireless sensor systems (US/Europe),
- security protocols (US/Europe)

Conclusion

Maude seems promising as a framework for IoTSec descriptions

- semantic modeling
- new paradigms easily defined
- model checking
- intrusion detection
- quick model design, prototyping and analysis
- probabilistic modeling and analysis