

Challenges DSO

- load & load variation
 - household to adapt
 - plans for control
 - variation of supply
 - daily / weekly
 - seasonal
 - list of statistics } load
 - grid stability (3 point out)
 - Phase measurements (SOH \pm)
 - Variation:
- Solar
Wind
Others?
- Security & privacy


Believe = $0.53 \times 0.53 \times 0.4 \sim 0.11$
0.5 0.5

Dec	0	0	1	1
Conf	0	1	0	1

→ Believe
Plausibility

2. Rec 0.3 0.8

3. Three parameters



Decision [0, 1]
Confidence [0, 1]

- a) critical components
- b) high uncertainty

Argument types - Examples
 - Alternative (A), e.g. "system is secure, if risk analysis is performed OR compliant with ISC
 - Complementary (C), e.g. "weights (100,50,..) on Encryption, key length, ..."
 - Necessary (all of them are necessary) - e.g. encryption is necessary
 - Sufficient (SC), if all the arguments are sufficient then the system is secure, if one of them

Models

- $P_1 \times P_2 + P_3$

-

- weight

how important is a
a factor?

example: sec "the weakest link"

→ weak security

→ low confidence

()²



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1. Find out how NORSTA works

2. Critics to NORSTA Linear
Quadratic?

3. Your suggestion security



Meeting 2Jul2019

Presentation:

Bottom line: title - author - page number

Dempster Shafer -> EXAMPLE: trust my smart meter

Mapping Decision and Confidence -> Example (Numbers)

Decision = Believe/Confidence

Typo NSC -argument

Argument types - Examples

- Alternative (A), e.g. "system is secure, if risk analysis is performed OR compliant with ISO xxxx standard"
- Complementary (C), e.g. " weights (100,50,..) on Encryption, key length, ..."
- Necessary (all of them are necessary) - e.g. encryption is necessary
- Sufficient (SC), if all the arguments are sufficient then the system is secure, if one of them

NOR-STA - add one column with example

Template can be provide:

highlight only the most important -> add: adequately evaluated

2. step . step decomposed

3. step

NSC Aggregation - example with numbers

SL

$$Bel(c) = Bel(w) \cdot Bel(a) \quad (b) \quad (c) \quad (d)$$

70% 70% 70% 30%

C

7
x

$$\frac{0.7 + 0.7 + 0.7}{3}$$

≈ 0.3

Uncertainty = adds up

Exemplify:

Argument #1 Subsystem #2

Fit plain

Next steps


eSmart. Certification

Today: compliance

Tomorrow: security classes

- Ckr A: configure
- CSS B: health data
- C: control electric
- C: head

Future — stable & net#
 — "control" Smart Home appliances



Secure & privacy aware

- Methodology
 - evaluate
 - create

A

Enhanced ? Security
(Novel) Classification System

apply

More resilient
Security classes

of ... for IoT systems
mapped on Smart Grids

Conf.

Methodology for Security Classification
... ..

Critical infrastructures applied for Smart Grids

attack-centric

resilient ² critical infrastructures ^{Journal}

Designing

Security - and privacy enhanced

III for Security II classes Smart Grid
IoT systems, applied for Smart Grids Risk Analysis are defined Spectrum

Conj ✓ abstract title
~~SLC~~

Journal ✓ title

IEEE Spectrum

Design & CI

~~Risk analysis~~ shorthand

A) Design

B) Analysis

AMI / smart classification

applied to Smart Home


IEEE Spectrum
Design

Home

new: (attack-centric)

→ security class

A system can have subsystems. In smart home overall have communication device, alarms and other systems. Consider pricing designer.




delivery chain

meter

class A service

⇒ class A system



Comm device


class (C) - reliability

centric




service

alarm




health intervention

device



device



device

PhD

exposure phd

IoT Systems

[res]

Conf

Methodology
~~SGSC~~

IT

Journal

apply Smart
Grid


SGSC

Energy
Sector

IEEE

Spectrum


18
months




IOT lifecycle

Smart Meter


- design
- impl.
- installation
- operation
- maintenance
- destroy
decommissioning



SCADA System



Method ①



Abstract
ANSI

③ Align the ^{and running} tools

Sec. Funct
Multi-Metric

commit to

Methodology

- Sysk goal (A)

- config
 - ~~net~~ architecture
 - sec. funct. & alists
- analysis



② Case Study on Real System

③ Smart Home (e2m)

Smart Meter

④ General Tool for the Metho-
dizing MOR-STH & R_{me}



IoT System

Security

System

eng.

Sec. functionality

eng.

Struct + parameters

Sec. factor

(uniqueness)


Metrics

Analysr:

impact


exposure

plus IT




firewall
encrypt
monitoring

Uniquely



!! Apply the Methodology strictly



Case: Apple vulnerability

Wifi;

Ethernet

USB ← auto run

Bluetooth
keyboard

10 Jan 2018

15 Mar
Apple root
→ 0.2

System design



Sect 0.6

Secured.
1-factor

Auth.
2-factor

Screen lock

↳ Wake-up on
ULM

Sec design
0.2 ~~0.6~~