

UNIK4750 - Measurable Security for the Internet of Things L12 – Multi-Metrics Analysis

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http://cwi.unik.no/wiki/UNIK4750, #IoTSec, #IoTSecNO

Overview



- & Your project
- & Recap: Security Ontologies (see L8)
- & Use case (application) SocialMobility
- & Values for Security, Privacy
- & Analyze the system of systems
- & Identify Security, Privacy attributes and functionality for a sub-system
- & Multi-Metrics analysis
- & Future work



UNIK4750: Lecture plan



- & 19.01 L1: Introduction
- & 26.01 L2: Internet of Things
- ℵ 02.02 L3: Security of IoT + Paper selection
- & 09.02
 - L4: Smart Grid, Automatic Meter Readings
 - L5: Service implications on functional requirements
- **& 16.02**
 - L6: Technology mapping
 - $\,\circ\,$ L7: Practical implementation of ontologies
- & 23.02 ---- Vinterferie
- ⊗ 02.03 L8-9: Paper analysis with 15 min presentation
- ⊗ 09.03 L10-11: Paper analysis with 15 min presentation

- L12: Multi-Metrics Method for measurable Security
- L13: System Security and Privacy analysis, Intrusion Detection

& 23.03

- $\,\circ\,$ L14: Real world examples, quest lecture
- L15: Multi-Metrics Weighting of an AMR subsystem
- & 30.03
 - ---- no lecture
- & 06.04
 - L16: Real world IoT service evaluation group work
 - $\,\circ\,$ L17: Wrap-up of the course
- & 13.04 ---- Påskeferie
- & 20.04 ---- Exam

<u>&</u> 16.03

Expected Learning outcomes

- Having followed the lecture, you can
- establish a scenario
- provide application examples
- provide reasons for the choice of s,p,d
- establish a system architecture with sub-systems and components
- explain the Multi-Metrics method
- (prepare for your own work)



Multi-Metrics Methodology for Assessment of Security, Privacy, and Dependability (SPD) for Security for Security (SPD) for the oration

» Iñaki Equia, Frode van der Laak, Seraj Fayyad, Cecilia Coveri, Konstantinos Fysarakis, George Hatzivasilis, Balázs Berkes, Josef Noll



Feb2015

Methodology: From System description to SPD level



- System: Automatic Meter System (AMS) consists of reader (AMR), aggregator, communications, storage, user access
- Sub-systems: AMR consists of power monitor, processing unit, communication
 unit
- © Component: AMR communication contains of a baseband processing, antenna, wireless link
- © Configuration Parameter: Wireless link: f=868 MHz, output power=?, Encryption=?

Social Mobility Main Focus



- $\&\ensuremath{\&}$ Focus on the industrial market
- & Identified challenges
 - \odot industry «needs security» with appropriate architectures
 - Communication module
 - Role-based access
 - \circ Middleware
- & System Security, Privacy and Dependability is assessed
- & Systemspd is compared to Goalsspd



Multi-Metrics - system composition



 \circ security



A STAS

SHIELD Multi Metrics Approach



O Specific application

© Social Mobility: privacy scenario

& Multi-Metrics approach to assess the SPD of a system

- [®] Provides a snapshot of the current state of the system
- Metrics for SPD parameters of sensors, network, service access
- ${\scriptstyle \textcircled{O}}$ Metrics $M_1 \hdots M_x, \, e.g.$ Network latency, Protection level

& Individual Metrics scaling SPD_{M1}(20,5,10)

- © Parametrisation of assessment, e.g. latency = 50 ms -> S:acceptable
- © Subjective translation into SPD severity
 - © Operational ranges defined as ideal, good, acceptable, critical, failure
 - [®] Max influence on the S,P,D value (estimate)

& Metrics combination to provide an SPD triplet: (60, 30, 70)

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Multi-Metrics components









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SHIELD Multi Metricsv2

& Metrics to SPD conversion

OParametrisation of system parameters, e.g. latency -> [ms]

SPD regression: «SPD value and importance for the system»

parameter into S,P,D value range, e.g. latency=50ms
:=> (ideal, good, acceptable, critical, failure)
Scaling according to System Importance, e.g. latency
:=> S_{max}=30, P_{max}=10, D_{max}=20

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OAssignment of SPD values, e.g. latency=50 ms
 O

⊗ Metrics combination to provide SPD_{System}: (60, 30, 70)
⊗Mathematical combination, e.g. S_{System}=100 - SQRT(S₁²+S₂²+...S_x²)







Example: Privacy in a Social Mobility Use Case

- Social Mobility, including social networks, here: loan of vehicle
- Shall I monitor the user?

- «User behaves»: privacy ensured
- «Crash»:
 emergency actions





Social Mobility Use Case



Social Mobility, including social networks, here:
 loan of vehicle

- Sc1: privacy ensured, «user behaves»
- Sc2: track is visible as user drives too fast
- Sc3: Crash, emergency actions



 Industrial applicability: Truck operation (Volvo), Autonomous operations on building places, add sensors (eye control)



Social Mobility Components



- o 1- Lightweight Cyphering (P1)
- © 2- Key exchange (P2)
- 3- Anonymity & Location Privacy (P10)
- 4- Automatic Access Control (P11)
- © 5- Recognizing DoS Attack (P13)
- 6- Intrusion Detection System (P15)
- 7- Attack surface metrics (P28)
- 8- Embedded SIM, sensor (P38)
- 9- Multimetrics (P27)







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Communication Subsystem Metrics



(SPD) Metrics

- \circ Port metric
- Communication channel
- GPRS message rate
- \circ SMS rate
- Encryption







Social Mobility - Examples of Metrics

GPRS message rate metric

Parameter(sec)	0.5	1	2	5	10	20	60	120	∞
Ср	80	60	45	30	20	15	10	5	0

Encryption metric

Parameter	No encryption	Key 64 bits	Key 128 bits	Not applicable
Ср	88	10	5	0

Metrics weighting Port (M1), w = 100Communication channel (M2), w = 100GPRS message rate (M3), w = 80SMS message rate (M4), w = 20Encryption (M5), w = 100





Multi-Metrics subsystem evaluation

			Critic	ality			£	SPD_P	
	C1	C2	C3	C4	Sub-Sys.		Scen. 1	Scen. 2	Scen. 3
SPD_{Goal}	-						(s, 80, d)	(s,50,d)	(s,5,d)
Multi-		1 	M3	-	C1				
Metrics	M1	M2	\cap	M5	\cap				
Elements			M4		C4				
Conf. A	30	20	0	5	17	83		•	•
Conf. B	61	20	4	5	32	68	•		•
Conf. C	41	20	9	5	23	77			
Conf. D	82	41	2	10	45	55	0		٠
Conf. E	82	41	18	10	45	55			
Conf. F	83	41	27	10	47	53			
Conf. G	82	42	4	88	70	30	•	Ö	•
Conf. H	82	42	40	88	73	27			
Conf. I	83	42	72	88	Alarm	21	٠		



Run-Through Example





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Multi-Metrics_{v2} - system composition



& here: communication sub-system vehicle <-> backend

○ Port metric



Configurations Communication Subsystem



Scenario 1	Conf. A	SSH
"privacy"	Conf. B	SSH + SNMP trap
	Conf. C	SSH + SNMP
Scenario 2	Conf. D	SSH + SNMP trap + SMS
"parents"	Conf. E	SSH + SNMP trap + SMS
	Conf. F	SSH + SNMP trap + SNMP + SMS
Scenario 3	Conf. G	SSH + SNMP trap + SMS
"emergency"	Conf. H	SSH + SNMP trap + SMS
	Conf. I	SSH + SNMP trap + SNMP + SMS



Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is an Internet-standard protocol for collecting and organizing information about managed devices on IP networks and for modifying that information to change device behavior. [Wikipedia] SNMP trap = alerts

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Metrics & weight (only privacy)



1) Port metric, weight w _p =40		
	Ср	SPDp
SNMP (UDP) 161 in the ES	40	60
SNMP trap (UDP) 162 in the BE	60	40
SSH (TCP) 23 in the ES	30	70
SMS	80	20

- 4) SMS message rate metric w_p=20 0,1, or 2 messages SPDp=90-100
- 5) Encryption metric w_p=60

	Ср	SPDp
No encryption	88	12
Key 64 bits	10	90
Key 128 bits	5	95
Not applicable	0	100

2) Communication channel metric, weight w_p=20

	Ср	SPDp
GPRS with GEA/3	20	80
SMS over GSM with A5/1	40	60

3) GPRS message rate metric w_p=80

nessage delay Cp SPDp Cp SPDp 0.5 sec 80 20 88 12 1 sec 60 40 10 90 2 sec 45 65 5 95 10 sec 20 20 10 10 20 20 20 10 10 20 60 20 10 10 20 60 20 101 10 20 20 20						
Cp SPDp 0.5 sec 80 20 S8 12 1 sec 60 40 10 90 2 sec 45 65 5 95 5 sec 30 70 0 100 20 sec 20 80 10 sec 10 sec 15 85 20 sec 10 sec 10 90)			message delay	Ср	SPDp
1 1	Ср	SPDp		0.5 sec	80	20
10 90 2 sec 45 65 5 95 5 sec 30 70 0 100 10 sec 20 80 VNIK4750 Measurable Security for IOT - #10	88	12		1 sec	60	40
5 95 0 95 100 10 sec 20 sec 15 85 10 sec 100 10 sec	10	90		2 sec	45	65
100 10 sec 20 80 20 sec 15 85 000 10 sec 10 90 000 100 sec 50 95	5	95		5 sec	30	70
20 sec 15 85 60 sec 10 90 UNIK4750, Measurable Security for IoT - #IoTS 120 sec 5 95)	100		10 sec	20	80
60 sec 10 90 UNIK4750, Measurable Security for IoT - #IoTS 120 sec 5 95				20 sec	15	85
UNIK4750, Measurable Security for IoT - #IoTS 120 sec 5 95				60 sec	10	90
	UNIK4750), Measurable Sec	curity for IoT - #IoTS	170 sec	5	95

Metrics analysis



		Metric 1	Metric 2	Metric 3	Metric 4	Sum	Ср	SPDp
Scenario 1	Conf. A	232	52	0	10	294	17	83
"privacy"	Conf. B 🤇	960	52	4	10	1 025 🤇	32	68
	Conf. C	434	52	18	10	513	23	77
Scenario 2	Conf. D 🔇	1 735	217	1	39	1 992	45	55
"parents"	Conf. E	1 735	217	73	39	2 064	45	55
	Conf. F	1 778	217	165	39	2 198	47	53
Scenario 3	Conf. G	1 735	228	4	2 998	4 964	70	30
"emergency	Conf. H	1 735	228	361	2 998	5 322	73	27
	Conf. I (1 778	228	1 171 📢	2 998	6 174 🄇	79	21
sum of we	eight: 155							



Multi-Metrics subsystem evaluation

	Criticality					SPD_P			
	C1	C2	C3	C4	Sub-Sys.		Scen. 1	Scen. 2	Scen. 3
SPD_{Goal}			-			245	(s,80,d)	(s,50,d)	(s,5,d)
Multi-			M3		C1				
Metrics	M1	M2	Π	M5	Ω				
Elements			M4		C4		and the second		
Conf. A	30	20	0	5	17	83		•	•
Conf. B	61	20	4	5	32	68		•	•
Conf. C	41	20	9	5	23	77			
Conf. D	82	41	2	10	45	55	0		٠
Conf. E	82	41	18	10	45	55			
Conf. F	83	41	27	10	47	53			
Conf. G	82	42	4	88	70	30	•		•
Conf. H	82	42	40	88	73	27	•		
Conf. I	83	42	72	88	Alarm	21	•		

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nSHIELD

Conclusions



- & SHIELD is the security methodology developed through JU Artemis/ECSEL
- & Security, Privacy, and Dependability (SPD) assessment
- & Social Mobility Use-Case: Ioan a car
 - o «behave» full privacy awareness -> SPDgoal = (s,80,d)
 - o «speeding» limited privacy -> SPDgoal = (s,50,d)
 - o «accident» no privacy -> SPDgoal = (s,5,d)
- & 11 configurations assessed

2 satisfy «behave», 3 satisfy «speeding», 0 satisfies «accident»
 & Goal: apply SHIELD methodology in various industrial domains

