



UNIK4750 - Measurable Security for the Internet of Things

L13 – Intrusion Detection

György Kálmán,
Mnemonic/CCIS/UNIK
gyorgy@unik.no

Josef Noll
UiO/UNIK
josef@unik.no

- What is an Intrusion Detection System
- Flavours of IDS
- Industrial case
 - ➔ Comparison to generic cases
 - ➔ Physical process and safety
- Industrial examples
- Conclusion

Definitions – as requested – both definitions by ISACA

- Information security: "Ensures that only authorized users (confidentiality) have access to accurate and complete information (integrity) when required (availability)
- Privacy: The rights of an individual to trust that others will appropriately and respectfully use, store, share and dispose of his/her associated personal and sensitive information within the context, and according to the purposes, for which it was collected or derived
- I think, both security and privacy is easier to see from the other way around:
- Losing security and privacy.
- If you loose information security: then you loose confidentiality of important data or the possibility to check its integrity or just can't access it.
- Same with privacy: if you loose it, then you can not control any more what is happening with private information

What is an Intrusion Detection System

- This is a practical example on fuzzy evaluation of different criteria and taking decisions by evaluating multi-dimension problems
- What is an intrusion: an attempt to break or misuse the system
- Might be internal or external source and can be physical, system or remote
- It is typically a set of entities distributed in the network and monitoring some network parameters

How an intrusion works

- Exploit different programming errors (e.g.: buffer overflow, no input validation)
- Unexpected input (e.g.: tamper with TCP checksum, fragmentation)
- Combination with creating special circumstances
- IDS need a baseline to work properly
- Baseline creation very much depends on the use
- We always assume, that they who attack behave differently

IDS flavours

- IDS can be based on:
 - ➔ Anomaly detection (heuristics) – challenge is good training and right set of sensitivity
 - ➔ Signature-based – challenge is to deal with new attacks
 - ➔ Typically we use a combination
- Or by location:
 - ➔ Host-based: the host os or application is running the logging, no additional hardware
 - ➔ Network-based: filters traffic, independent of clients

IDS in industrial environments

- Two important factors: much more clean traffic baseline is possible and relation to physical process and safety
- We can't design a system to be secure forever – count with failure: fail-safe, fail-operational, graceful state changes
- Tamper detection and evidence
- The only difference between systems that can fail and systems that cannot possibly fail is that, when the latter actually fail, they fail in a totally devastating and unforeseen manner that is usually also impossible to repair(1)
- In an industrial environment the assumption that attackers will behave differently is not necessarily true

IDS in industrial environments

- IDS is a system: evaluation of logs, evaluation of network traffic, maintenance on firewall and IDS infrastructure (software+taps)
- Getting a reaction is actually easier in the industrial environment: typical to have 24 hours staffing somewhere, also physical security and safety
- Challenges with shared infrastructure and suppliers
- Possible approach: whitelisting, «stateful» payload analysis (operational envelope)

Example rules

- There are different ways, but take this snort rule as an example:

```
alert tcp !192.168.1.0/24 any -> 192.168.1.0/24 111 \  
  (content:"|00 01 86 a5|"; msg:"external mountd access");
```

- Dynamic rule example (both examples are from the snort manual):

```
activate tcp !$HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 143 (flags:PA; \  
  content:"|E8COFFFFFF|/bin"; activates:1; \  
  msg:"IMAP buffer overflow!");  
dynamic tcp !$HOME_NET any -> $HOME_NET 143 (activated_by:1; count:50;)
```

- The scan rule itself is something «explicit» here, but the reaction will be fuzzy

Industrial attacks

- No difference here: injection, man-in-the-middle, replay etc.
- Long life, high utilization of equipment and legacy support open for more attacks than in an office case
- SCADA compared to DCS/PCS
- Resilience and restoration
- Because of the use of COTS products, you actually might use the very same exploits, like windows on HMI

Industrial examples, from ICS-CERT (6)

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant [2003]

- The Slammer worm penetrated a private computer network at Ohio's Davis-Besse nuclear power plant
- Disabled a safety monitoring system for nearly five hours
- Power plant was protected by a firewall
- In 1998 the same plant was hit by a tornado (natural disaster)

Industrial examples, from ICS-CERT (6)

Maroochy Shire Sewage Spill [2000]

- First recorded instance of an intruder that “deliberately used a digital control system to attack public infrastructure”
- Software on his laptop identified him as “Pumping Station 4” and after suppressing alarms controlled 300 SCADA nodes
- Disgruntled engineer in Queensland, Australia sought to win the contract to clean up the very pollution he was causing
- He made 46 separate attacks, releasing hundreds of thousands of gallons (264,000) of raw sewage into public waterways

Industrial examples, from ICS-CERT (6)



CSX Train Signaling System [2003]

- Sobig virus blamed for shutting down train signaling systems throughout the east coast of the U.S.
- Virus infected Florida HQ shutting down signaling, dispatching, and other systems
- Long-distance trains were delayed between four and six hours

L13 Conclusions



- Intrusion Detection is an example, where a collection of parameters will serve as an input to a fuzzy system
- Industrial systems might be quite well suited for «sharp» heuristics
- The main difference is the physical process back (both plus and minus)
- Evaluation of the detection system is very much in line with the classification examples shown in previous lectures: one can define a set of metrics and analyse which level the system is can reach.

References



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