Spoof proof CSAC SMACC - a spoofing resilient GPS clock
Spoof proof CSAC SMACC - a spoofing resistant GPS clock
|Supervisor(s)||Sverre Holm, Harald Hauglin|
|Problem description:|| The main goal of this master project is program a controller (SMACC – smart
miniature atomic clock controller) which will complement a commercial GPS controlled clock so that it becomes ‘spoof proof’, i.e. hardened against GPS jamming and spoofing attacks. The project will use a multifactorial approach to evaluate the validity/integrity of received GPS signals, based on a number of GPS observables as well as clock correction modelling. In particular, the project will use the stability of a CSAC1 (chip scale atomic clock) to build resilience against a certain class of ‘seamless’ GPS spoofing attacks2. Moreover, the stability of the CSAC will provide enhanced autonomous operation in the case of a spoofing or jamming attacks. The spoof proof CSAC SMACC will be tested against spoofing scenarios generated by a GNSS simulator.
|Methods and Tools:|| The tools and methods in this thesis are based on
|Time schedule|| The envisaged time schedule (for a long thesis/60 ECTS) is:
|Pre-Knowledge||This thesis includes a reasonable amount of programming. The envisaged thesis is based on radio communications, thus expects the user to have followed at least two radio-related courses|
|Keywords||GPS jamming, GPS spoofing, atomic clock, synchronization|
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Background: Timing – in the form accurate and stable reference frequencies and/or accurate time stamps referenced to UTC – is a critical and valuable information asset in industrial control systems and IT infrastructure. Accurate timing is very often generated by GPS disciplined clocks – in which ‘low grade’ or inaccurate clocks are being continuously steered/corrected by GPS signals. A properly operating GPS disciplined clock will have the long term accuracy and stability of the atomic clocks of the GPS time scale, at an insignificant cost. However, since a GPS antenna needs a clear view of the sky and since the civil GPS code structure is known, GPS based timing may be viewed as an unencrypted and physically unsecured port into valuable infrastructure. The methods employed by a time hacker may include jamming - denial of access to GPS corrections by excessive radio noise - or spoofing - injection of malicious code in the form of transmission of GPS signals containing misleading information.
This master project will exploit a number of GPS and clock observables in order to detect and resist a number of different types of GPS hacking attacks.